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PART ONE 
1 
In cons-idering an eoonomic problem of such 
soope of the tarif~ one must bear in mind at the out-
set that the solution of such problems is never ac-
complished by the efforts of isolated thinkers. One 
is likely to believe that in reading a chapter in 
some text of elementary economics that he has derived 
a very logical and comprehensive knowledge of the tar-
iff. The arguments seem conclusive whether it is the 
text of a free trade economist that you- consult or the 
text of a protectionist. It is true that most of theae 
arguments are sound when appl~ed to the 8~tuation as 
understood by their proponents, but the whole problem 
is beclouded by misapprehensions of the sort of situa-
tion that exists. 
One is likely at this distance and with this 
perspective to view dispassionately the tariff problem 
which oonfronted this nation at some previous period 
in history and discourse with oonsiderable finality on 
the unwisdom of the efforts of that time. What one is 
likely to disregard is the general feeling of the pop-
ulace in regard to the political aspects of economic 
questions. One is likely to disregard their desire for 
governmental self security, or their resentment toward 
trade discrimination. 
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In the study of individuals it is recognized 
that an understanding of behavior comes from a knowledge 
of their inherited traits and an understanding of their 
reaction to environment. Yet nations are too often re-
garded as growing up isolated in the midst of other na-
tions; are regarded as having policies which do not at-
fect nor are affected by other nations. To assume such 
an attitude is much like condemning a boy for striking 
another no matter what provocation may have existed for 
his defenoe. So in this paper it shall be the purpose 
not to approve or condemn but to make clear the origins 
and to show the type of Amerioan Tariff Legislation. 
One more thing before beginning this discus-
sion. It is natural to regard all aotion as having 
cause and creating effects. Because this is character-
istic of human thought it is necessary that one more 41& 
tinction be made clear. Many times in history men have 
set forces in motion with high purposes and the unfore-
seen results have been disastrous and other men with 
evil intentions have wrought great good. Thus the effort 
of man to create effects is striking and very interest-
ing, but of more interest by far are the tremendous and 
unforeseen results of forces which men with little a-
wareness of their potency have set into motion. The 
effeots of suoh acts can be too easily confused with 
their purpose, although in the majority of cases they 
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are not even remotely related. 
With this in mind let us proceed to the ex-
amination of the origin of tariffs. 
PART TWO 
EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL 
BEGINNINGS 
5 
In the fourteenth century there began to arise 
in England a plan of national economy called meroantil-
ism, a word deriving its meaning from a Latin stem con-
taining the idea of trading; so the mer'~antile system 
as it applied to national economy meant t'he effort of a 
nation to enrich itself by a method in trading whereby 
the nation would export a value of goods greater than 
her imports thus creating a credit for herself payable 
in precious metals. The precious metals were by these 
economists regarded as the reality of wealth. 
Behind merea',ntilism is a deep seated instinc-
tive human urge which psychologists refer to as the 
hoarding instinct. Rising in men in the times when 
hoarded food and weapons gave a measure of security to 
primitive man it manifests itself in our own century in 
the disappearance from circulation into small private 
hoards of two billion dollars in gold in times of dearth 
(1931). Nothing could be more natural than that England 
should adopt a policy designed to bring into her borders 
a stream of the precious metals as a reserve against 
times of war for purposes of defence. 
To accomplish a trade balance which would 
really produce such results it was necessary to put a 
great many powers in the hands of government. Into its 
care was thrust the power to regulate commerce so that 
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the commonwealth would benefit. Some industries were 
encouraged, others stifled by the move to effect a sound 
national economy Ullder the prevailing idea that the gov-
ernment is the master of the economic destinies of its 
people, an idea which has not yet been wholly overthrown. 
As it affected the colonial peoples the mer-
cantile theory made a clear distinction between colonies 
and the mother country. The mother country serving as a 
nucleus placed her colonies in the position of feeders. 
They were maintained under the governance of the mother 
country to be controlled by the principle that their con-
duct should be upon whatever plan would most profit the 
mother country. An examination of the situation with 
which England was faced at this time will make clear her 
position as regards the American Colonies. 
In England the Industrial Revolution beginning 
in the early part of the 18th century brought about Buch 
a rapid growth of manufactures that it was necessary 
that the colonies take the shock of overproduction. Be-
cause they were under her power the colonies could hardly 
choose but to buy their manufactured goods from England. 
The desire for stability of markets and the effort to 
open new markets made themselves felt in the character 
of colonial legislation during this period. In the ab-
sense of any practical method of resistance the colonies 
became producers of raw materials and agricultural 
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products for manufacturing England, the returns from their 
exports going to purchase imported English goods. There 
was little incentive to manufacture in the colonies as 
long as the population was centered upon the seaboard, 
since better goods could be more cheaply procured from 
the English establishments. 
The idea that a country should have a favorable 
balance of trade as a normal condition to be continued 
over long periods of time is a notion deriving its exist-
ence from the merchantilist school of economists. Inas-
much as favorable balance refers to a trade condition 
under which a nation's imports are less valuable than its 
exports and under which it expects the balance to be paid 
in gold instead of goods it reflects the ,.mer.cantile no-
tion that opulence, if not represented by precious metals 
themselves, is at least likely to exist in countries that 
are well supplied with that particular form of wealth. 
Any trade manipulation which tended to so divert or regu-
late imports and exports that the exporting nation would 
be receiving for her exports both gold and goods was 
termed under that economy to be wise and helpful inasmuch 
as it was deemed to bring into the nation the foundation 
of prosperity as they conceived it, a bountiful supply of 
gold. 
It is natural with this theory as a foundation 
that the government should consider the regulation of 
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trade as one of its vital and important functions. It 
is not surprising that during the hey day of ,mQ~Gan­
tilism the business of gUiding industry and controlling 
trade fastened itself upon the government as the only 
body having the competence and extending its activities 
over a sufficiently broad field to really effectively 
administer suoh a task. 
In the carrying out of these obligations there 
were devised methods of converting trade into new channel~ 
and arranging its flow and extent which ran the gamut 
from direct subsidy and mandatory legislation to laws 
about the carrying trade and protective import duties. 
At this particular time the various forms of 
encouragement and discouragement were less concerned with 
the welfare of individual industries and trading and more 
so with the general welfare of the nation and such pro-
blems as the building up of a defensible nation. whose 
people could afford war and to whom war with its disas-
trous effeot upon commerce would not bring too serious 
discomfiture. 
No part of the meMantile system has fixed 
itself upon the world with more tenacity than the doc-
trine of protective tariff. A protective tariff estab-
lishes a duty so high that to pay it will add so greatly 
to the price of the good that it cannot be introduced 
into the country in competition with domestic goods. 
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To be c1assi£ied as a tariff for revenue such duties must 
be low enough so that the addition of the duty to the 
selling price will not seriously constrict its market. 
A tariff for revenue does just what its name 
implies. The import duties colleoted are used to defray 
the expenses of government while the purpose behind the 
protective tariff is to foster the growth of production 
in some industry which at the time and under the condi-
tions is for some reason failing to maintain itself in 
the face of foreign competition, or to encourage domestic 
production of some commodity hitherto imported. In ef-
fect, the tariff serves simply to keep a trade good from 
coming into the protected market. 
This ,m:er.,Q,antile doctrine was not 81 together 
unopposed even in its beginnings, but the whole system 
of self-reliant communities was so characteristic of 
early English villages and the ,mar'asntile system had 
been so generally accepted by individuals who sold com-
modities for money without completing the exchange of 
that money for goods that it was easily instituted as a 
system of national economy. It should be 'characterized 
as the political philosophy of a nation inured to the 
hardship of thrift. 
Adam Smith in 1776 published his work called 
"The Wealth of Nations." Thera is launched in this work 
a line of imaginative reasoning embodying the idea that 
lO 
in the natural course of trading, individuals trade only 
when what they have is of less worth to them than that 
for which they exchange it; . hence both parties to a 
trade are profited, and barriers to trade in hindering 
this trading process are injurious to nations; that the 
wealth of nations lies in the v~lume of their trade not 
in the balance. He further postulated that if division 
of labor be profitable in making pins in England then 
were such divisions world wide, each section producing 
that which it could produce most economically under its 
conditions and trading for things produced more econom-
ically by some other section under conditions more favor-
able to the production of that other good, the economies 
in production would make the trading even more economical. 
It was during the very highest wave of mercan .. · .. · 
ti1ism in England that the North American Coloni~~ were 
~O~~h~~~~~ 
establisli~.under the same system over 100 years before, 
and by the time of the real growth of English colonies 
in America the Spanish colonies were well on their way 
to decline because they had been mulcted of their gold 
and exploited of their raw materials by the mother countr~. 
The commanding colonial philosophy was one of making the 
colonies subservient economically to the mother country. 
The trend toward natural adjustment theories in economics 
led in England by Adam Smith was just beginning to make 
itself felt not only in England but in France, where it 
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was called the "laissez faire" theory of political eeon-
omy. 
The principle of tariffs was firmly imbedded 
in the colonial settlers of North America. It was a 
part of their English heritage growing naturally out of 
the political philosophies and practices in England at 
that time. Tariffs and other restrictions upon trade sue 
as the navigation laws as well as encouragements to trade 
in the form of bounties and direct subsidies had been 
used in England prior to this time as well as duties for 
revenue. So it is not unnatural that we find a general 
tariff provision embodied in the laws of Massachusetts 
as early as 1638. A part of the text of that law reads, 
"Whosoever shall buy or receive out of any ship any fruit, 
spice, wine, strong water, or tobacco shall pay the treas-
urer one-sixth part of the price or the value thereof; 
and every person who shall buy or receive any of the said 
commodities with intent to retail the same shall pay the 
. 1 
treasurer one-third the prJ.ce or value thereof. 
It is evident that these duties were for the 
most part upon articles not usually produced in Massachu-
setts and thence the chief purpose of this bill must have 
been the gaining of revenue. However, there is contained 
in it the provision for double duty upon consignments to 
1 Dewey, 
1922. 
Financial History £! the Uhited States. 
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merchants. It is altogether conceivable that this should 
act as a considerable check upon the trade. 
Some of the other measures were clearly protec-
tive. Maryland discriminated against provisions andliq-
uor import~d from Pennsylvania. ~bile Pennsylvania in 
turp recognizing the intent and the use of the measure 
retaliated against 1~:aryland 1 s shipping. 
The character of most of the colonial customs 
is easily seen by the nature of things taxed. Wines, 
molasses, rum and spices came in for a good share and in 
these things it is unlikely that there was any home enter-
prise to profit while these duties provec;. a good source 0 
revenue. 
SOIDe colonies, however, notably South Carolina 
and Massaohusetts had enacted about 1700 very extensive 
tariff legislation with both ad valorum and specific du-
ties.1 These inter-colonial tariffs while they served 
primarily as a source of revenue were in some cases se-
verely protective and even the small revenue tariffs 
served to hinder trade in this remote area in which, at 
best, goods ~ere largely immobile because of natural bar-
riers in the form of streams, impenetrable forests and 
mountains, and lack of developed transportation facilities 
It is certain that trade between the colonies was dis-
couraged considerably by these duties. 
lDewey, Financial History of the United states. 1922 
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But beyond the slight inconveniences to trade 
it may be safely concluded that there was little effect 
upon the people from these laws. The extent of inter-
colonial trade could not have been very great and duties 
injurious to British trade were promptly repealed by the 
English influenoes. However, the very presence of this 
sort of legislation in the colonies is material proof 
that the mercantile system had taken some root there. 
There was not only a trade policy in each col-
ony deriving its tenets from the interpretation of the 
needs of the colony; that is, it was made by the powers 
within the colony ruld for the benefit of the colony, but 
there was also the trade policy of the colony as regula-
ted and controlled by outside interests through the me-
dium of the English Parliament and for the benefit of 
England. 
In entering into a discussion of this period, 
it is not unlikely that the current interpretation of 
history will prevail and that the notion will continue 
that the British rule tended to fix upon the colonies an 
economic system opposing in essentials the theories which 
tbe colonists bad evolved within their new environment. 
The colonists were just as desirous of trade regulation 
as the mother country and in their small way gave offense 
to Great Britain by imposing duties1wl:ich were distinctly 
1 
Greene, E.B. Frovincial America. Hart Series. 68. 1905. 
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anti-Eri tish. The .. mSJ:c.ant'ile idea had settled itself 
among the colonists. In their conduct toward other na-
tions and toward one another their attitudes were ent1re-
ly me~~antilistic. The economio struggle between Col-
onies and mother country was a struggle of colonial mer-
,c.antilism against English lns:ec.antilism. 
The growth of manufaotures in the colonies, 
particularly in woolens, iron, and hats, and the incideno 
of colonial manufactured goods upon the English market 
brought about in the third decade of the 18th century 
legislation which was designed to curtail the growth of 
manufactures1 and particularly to keep the oolonial prod-
ucts from displacing English manufactured goods in the 
English market. It was to the advantage of England that 
the colonies devote themselves to the production of raw 
materials sui table for use in manuf.actories in the mother 
country. 
Manufactures thus restrained sought other mar-
kets. They fOruld in trade with the Spanish, Dutch, and 
~lrench Viest Indies a relationship mutually profitable. 
By trading their goods for molasses, turning the molasses 
into rum which they used in the African slave trade and 
trading the slaves for more molasses in the West Indies 
1Act of 1699 concerning wool, 1732 concerning hats, and 
1750 concerning iron, also navigation acts. 
Faulkner, H.U. American Economic History. 144. 1924. 
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the colonists supplied themselves with the specie for 
carrying on trade with the mother country and supplied 
the Spanish, ]'rench, and Dutch West Indies wi th abundent 
cheap labor so that they were soon underselling the Brit.-
ish Indies. 
Parliament in response to t~e demand of the 
British west Indies passed the Molasses Act in 1733 which 
instituted a prohibitive duty on molasses coming into the 
American colonies. Had this duty aoted as it was intends 
the colonies would have been seriously injured, but for~ 
tunately they were both able and disposed to evade these 
restrictions. Various authors estimate that from one-
third to one-half the colonial trade in 1700 was contra-
band. Not only was it regarded as customary to pursue 
this sort of business, but many of the colonial leaders 
were engaged in this highly profitable business. Pro-
fessor Bogart quotes D. A. \1el18: "The oolonists were 
a nation of law-breakers. Nine tenths of the colonial 
merchants were smugglers. One quarter of the whole num-
ber of the signers of the Deolaration of Independence 
were bred to the contraband trade. John Bancock waS the 
prince of contraband traders, and, with John Adams as his 
counsel, was on trial before the Admiralty court in 
1 
Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science, I, 75. (the 
original source not referred to) 
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Boston at the exact hour of the shedding of blood at 
Lexington, to answer for half a million dollars penalties 
alleged to have been by him incurred as a smugg1er. tf 
Another trade practice then common was the trading of rum 
for fish in Newfoundland, the fish to be traded for goods 
in southern Europe. 
Lodge and Garner in their Ristor, of ~ United 
states point out that "in 1763, of the 15,000 hogsheads 
of molasses which were imported into Massachusetts from 
the West Indies only 500 came from the British Islands.1 
Rhode Island brought in 14,000 hogsheads in one year, 
only 2,500 of whicb were imported in conformity to law. n 
In 1763 the ministry of Pitt gave way to that 
of Grenville. Pitt had maintained a friendly and under-
standing attitude toward the colonies in their evasions 
of various trade acts. The molasses act had remained 
almost entirely disregarded for thirty years. Now with 
a new King, George III, and a new ministry headed by 
Grenville and supplemented by Townshend,the Minister of 
Finance there arose a new taxing policy. Two major 
factors united to cause this change in attitude. The 
first was the feeling of unlimited authority that surged 
over the heads of British affairs; the other the depleted 
lQuoting from Weeden's Social ~ Economic History of 
England, vol. ii, p. 754. (Original source not refer-
red to.) 
17 
state of the British treasury, and it is likely that the 
depleted treasury was the greater cause. 
The effort took two trends--one the enforoement 
of the already enacted molasses duty, and the other the 
passing of new legislation levying other duties. The fol-
lowing year 1764 brought the passage of the Sugar act cut-
ting the duty on molasses and levying new ones on indigo, 
coffee, wines, silks, and calicoes. l 
Resentment against these acts was strong. Be-
hind it lay the widening breach of economic interests 
between the American colonies and their mother country; 
a breach widened and deepened by the fact that neither 
was quite able to understand the spirit of the other. The 
colonies because they apparently received little benefit 
from Farliamentary taxation were resentful toward the very 
policy; and its application to such a vital part of their 
traffic as the molasses trade was an offense almost un-
pardonable. 
Resistance to the Sugar act and the stamp act 
and to the duty on tea, which were for the purpose of 
raising money for the defense of the colonies took the 
form of two severe economic boycotts. The first in 1766 
was so effective that it brought about repeal of the stamp 
act and revision of the sugar act. The next was in 1768 
IFaulkner, H. U. American Economic History.' 148. 1924. 
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following the passage of the Quartering act and a further 
revenue act which placed duties upon glass, paper, paint-
1 
ers' colors, red and white lead, and tea. This, too, 
was effective and brought about in 1770 a repeal of the 
offensive legislation, except a nominal tax on tea. 
It 1s useless to try to measure the extent to 
which trade regulation in the form of import duties was 
responsible for the breach between the colonies and Great 
Britain. To single out of the myriad divergencies--socia , 
political, and economic--that single cause ruld trace its 
effects is impossible, but it is certain that these du-
ties played no small part in driving the wedge that 
brought about American Independence. It must further be 
noted that the system of Tariffs and the knowledge of 
their uses was early impressed upon tLe colonists and 
that the system of trade diversion used by England was 
the seed of the protective system, the growth of which 
it is the intention of this paper to trace. 
As the colonies approached the rebellion it is . 
interesting to note that according to ]'aullcner there were 
less than ten per cent of the population engaged'-~indue-
... \, 
try. Among the great industries were ship building, fish 
ing, and shipping, most of which was carried on in the 
New England states while planting was predominant in the 
south. 
1 Faulkner, H.U. American ~conomic Historl. 149. 1924. 
PART 3 
FIRST AMERICAN TARIFFS 
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In 1776 American Colonies started the business 
of gaining their independenoe from England. The rebel-
lion inasmuch as it interfered wi tl1 tra.d.e relatione and 
caused the cessation of trade from England whence the 
colonists had been wont to look for their manufaotured 
goods stimulated a general feeling of self-trust. Many 
things previously bought from abroad were manufactured in 
the colonies while the direction of trade turned from 
England to Holland, Spain, and France. The war did not 
find the colonies entirely dependent economically. The 
colonists had sohooled themselves in the business of do1ne 
without imports through two non-importation agreements 
both of which had acted as stimuli to American manufact-
ures. Added to these the years of the revolution gave a 
oonsiderable period in whioh industry became a necessity 
in the colonies. Truly it was in a great meaSlue con-
duoted without a factory system, but it was industry and 
it served to keep up the spirit of the colonies by sup-
plying their wants. 
But tbe struggling little manufacturers in Am-
arica were not able to compete at the close of the war 
witt tbe influx of European goods. Political independence 
of a doubtful sort had been achieved, but there was anoth-
er war to be waged to place America in a position of econ-
omic ascendency. Treaties to end the war had been signed 
but these did not end the economic struggle. The best 
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minds of the colonies including Benj"amin Franklin and 
John Jay were unable to wrest from the great trade nation 
of Euro~e commercial treaties equitable toward the colon-
ies. Among them only Prussia and Sweden were willing to 
trade reci~rocally while treaties were signed with France, 
Portugal and Holland not favorable to the new nation. l 
The ~osition of the colonies was in an economic 
sense extremely precarious. There was no commercial ag-
reement with England who had been, prior to this time, th 
outstanding nation in American trade. The new government 
founded upon the Articles of Confederation had no power t 
regulate commerce. Rising as it did from a people resent 
ful of law and taxation; rising as it did from a people 
inherently fearful of government abuse of power; rising 
as it did from states jealous of their authority, this 
government was naturally powerless to meet a situation 
so critical as that which confronted it in 1783. Here 
was a situation in which a strong central government m~gh 
have used the tariff to control trade and to furnish the 
much needed revenues for meeting the expenses of govern-
ment. Unfortunately at no time did this government pos-
sess the power for carrying into effect its provisions. 
In 1783 this congress tried to meet this situation by 
means of a revenue bill containing provisions for a 5% 
IFaulkner, H. U. American Economic History. 177. 1924. 
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ad valorum general duty and several specific provisions 
as well. Due to its inherent weakness in execution they 
were unable to enforce this provision. It fell to the 
states to protect their own shipping which they proceeded 
to do by means of tariff measures ranging froID1in the 
South general revenue measures to severely protective 
duties in some of the northern states. 
So irregular were these state tariffs and so 
difficult were they of enforoement that there was little 
benefit inuring from them. The bulk of imports sought 
the ports at which duties were very low or non-existent. 
In this manner . the haphazard state duties were rendered 
useless. 
The new Constitution reserved to the national 
government the power to regulate oommerce. The weaknesses 
in administration and exeoution inherent to the articles 
had been remedied by .the institution of a three branch 
government headed by a president, and by the giving of 
the new government the power to lay and collect taxes. 
In 1789 the new Congress took up on April 8, 
the business of levying import duties. Behind this act1o~ 
was the imperative need of the newly organized government 
for funds to defray its expenses. It was imperative that 
there be devised a quick, sound method of raiSing money; 
a method recognizing the disability and further disin-
clination of the p·eople to submit to direct taxation. 
In the immediate past lay the failure of the Articles 
beoause they had no certain source of revenue inasmuch 
as taxes levied or apportioned upon the states had never 
been collectable. ~he strength of the new government 
was uncertain; its stability only to be assured through 
strengthening its credit. In the face of these finanoial 
neoessities the first tariff was designed to create re-
venues. 
Certain industries had gained a foothold during 
the years of uncertain imports. They were not strong, 
organized or insistent, but incidental to the revenue 
purposes of the tariff there were included in the measure 
several duties intended for proteotion. From Dewey's 
Finanoial H1storl £f !h! u~ited states we derive a most 
complete list of those articles upon which specific dutie 
were levied. (Tables I and II) 
The method used in thie first tariff legislatio 
is interesting. Madison first proposed a skeleton bill 
containing the provision for 5% general rate ad valorum 
as well as a list of things recommended for speoific du~ 
ties, but there was no proposal as to the amount of duty 
upon each article. The argument then turned upon the 
matter of the purposes of the bill. In its origin as has 
been mentioned, this measure dated back to 1783 and Was 
simply a revamping of the bill forwarded by the Congress 
under the Artioles. Suggestions were made as to the rate 
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Table I 
Iron ••••••••••••••••••• 71% 
Glassware, Chinaware, 
Stonewar'e •••••••••••••• 10% 
Cocoa •••••••••••••••••• l¢ per lb. 
Coffee ••••••••••••••••• 2t¢ per lb. 
Molasses ••••••••••••••• 2i¢ per gal. 
Jamaica Spirits •••••••• 10¢ per gal. 
All other spirits •••••• S¢ per gal. 
Tarred Cordage ••••••••• 75¢ per cwt. 
untarred Cordage ••••••• 90¢' per cwt. 
Brown Sugar •••••••••••• l¢ per lb. 
Refined Sugar •••••••••• 3¢ per lb. 
Tea •••••••••••••••••••• 6¢'-20¢' per lb. 
Salt ••••••••••••••••••• 6¢ per bu. 
Madiera. \Vine • • • • • • • • • • • 18¢' per gal. 
Other Wines • • • • • • • • • • • • 10¢ per gal. 
Hemp • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 60rl per cwt. 
11ails • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l¢ per lb. 
steel 
Twine 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
56¢' per cwt. 
$2.00 per cwt. 





















ESTDvtATED PER CE¥T OF DUTIES AD VALOR~! FOR 
YEARS 1791-1801. · , · • Yr. · Rate • Amt. Collected · • • • · • • 
$4,399,000 1791 8t • · • • · · • 1792 · 11 • 3,443,000 · · • • · • 1793 · 1:;t • 4,255,000 · • · • · · 1794 • 14 • 4,801,000 · • · • · • 1795 · 9 • 5,588,000 · • • • 
• • 
1796 • 8t • 6,568,000 · · · • · · 1797 · 10 • 7,550,000 · • • • · · 1798 • 10~ • 7,106,000 · • • • · • 1799 · at • 6,610,000 · • · • · · 1800 • S.l.. • 9,081,000 • · • 4- • · • 1801 • 9 • 10, 751,000 • · • · 
IDewey. Financial History of the United states. 
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of duties and protection was sought by s~me of the members 
As is shown by the table the average ad valorum rate of 
duties was about at per cent. Several industries received 
some protection in this measure. The ship building ,in-
dustry which had grown to great proportions in New England 
caused the growth of hemp and tarred cordage industries 
which were Ilrotected in this act, as well as the iron in-
dustry'. 
cromptonl notes that there was a slow growth 
during the following years of a sentiment for protection, 
not unified but sporadic. During the period of about 
eighteen years up to the year 1807 there were about 25 
revisions of this act most of which were ocoasioned by 
needs for more revenue. In 1792 Hamilton issued his now 
famous "Report on Manufactures". This paper although it 
had little effect at the time was a powerful and brillian 
exegesis of protective principles. There has probably 
never come from the pen of any Americal statesman or ec-
onomist a more masterful and complete favorable analysis 
of the protective tariff system. 
To the presidency in 1801 came a man almost dia 
metrically opposed to the views of Hamilton. Thomas Jef-
ferson was a man grounded in the belief in an American 
peasantry. The Federalist party and Hamilton believed 
1 
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that in centralized population and industrial growth the 
real economic health of the nation lay. The Republican 
party believed that in the pastoral and agricultural pur-
suits man gains freedom for contemplation, and in com-
munion with the soil finds a philosophy more satisfying 
than opulence. 
While much is said of the profound influence 
which the physiocrats and laissez-faire philosophers 
exercised upon Jefferson we find in his beliefs in free 
trade an intense desire to preserve Amerioa for the 80il-
loving peasantry, believing as he did that the strength 
of citizenry arose from contact with the Boil. 
It is peculiar and ironio that it was the cours 
pursued by Jefferson, not deliberately but in the course 
of circumstances, that gave the first valid reason for 
American protectionism. 
Due to the fact that the greater part of Europe 
was engaged in the Napoleonic war the carrying trade of 
neutrals had grown greatly. In 1804 exports amounted to 
$77,700,000; in 1805, $95,500,000; in 1806.$101,500,000; 
and in 1807, $108.300,000.1 France and England decreed 
paper blockades in efforts to stop the supplies of foods 
and raw materials carried to the enemy by neutrals. Bo-
gart estimates that about 1600 American vessels were 
l~aussig, F. W. quoting Treasury Reports. 12. 1914. 
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captured and commerce valued at $60,000,000 by French and 
British ships. 
lefferson had little choice in the defence of 
shipping but to pass a non-intercourse act which before 
it went into effect was superseded by the Emb'srgo Act 
forbidding American vessels to leave port bound for forei 
countries. This was followed two years later by the non-
intercourse act which lifted the embargo on shipe bound 
for foreign ports except the ports of England and France. 
(Tables III and IV) 
These acts were followed in 1812 by declaration 
of war against England. We have here a period of seven 
years (1807-1814) during which there was far less than 
normal importation; a period which more by acoident than 
design was ideal to the encouragement of the growth of 
manufactures in this oountry. 
That such a growth did occur is witnessed by 
Gallatin's report issued in 1809,1 in which he records 
that manufactures of wood, leather, soap, and tallow 
candles, spermaceti oil and candles, flaxseed oil, refined 
sugar, coarse , earthenware, snuff, hair powder, chocolate, 
and mustard were sufficient for domestic consumption, and 
that manufactures of iron, cotton, wool, flax, hemp; hate, 
paper, printing, types, printed books, and playing cards; 
spiritous and malt liquors; gunpowder, window glass; jew-
ECOllomic:--History of the United states. 1918. 
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elry and clocks; manufactures of lead; straw bonnets 
and hats; and wax candles were well established. 
After the war the secretary of the treasury, Dallas, 
made a report showing a considerable growth in industry 
during the war particularly in iron and textile manufac-
1 tures. F. W. Taussig describes the growth in this sen-
tence, "Establishments for the manufacture of cotton 
goods, woollen cloths, iron, glass, pottery and other 
articles sprang up with a mushroom growth." 
At the end of the war manufactories owing their ex-
istence to the shifting of domestic demand from the for-
eign market to the home markets were severely threatened 
by the incidence of foreign competition. The value of 
imports in 1814 was just about $13,000,000 and in 1816 
they had risen to more than $14~,OOO,OOO. The tendency 
was for both imports and exports to be stimulated and 
there was marked a considerable tendency in England toward 
dumping manufactures in America to nip in the bud the 
first flower of American manufacturing in an effort to 
keep the nation from achieving any degree of economic 
ascendency. Typical of this spirit is the oft quoted 
statement of Lord Brougham from a speech delivered in 
1816 in the House of Commons. "It was well worth while 
to incur a loss upon the first exportation, in order, by 
lTaussig, F. W. ~nited states Tariff History. 17. 194. 
30 
the glut, to stifle in the cradle those rising manufact-
ures in the United states which the war had forced into 
existence contrary to the natural course of things.n The 
continued domination of the British trade policy by those 
who held to mercantilism led to the passing of the Corn 
Law of 1815 restricting the flow of American grain into 
England and in general closing the market which at the 
close of the war had been so eagerly accepted by America. 
Had England been willing to accept American imports at 
this time it is likely that that preponderant section of 
American populace which engaged itself in agriculture 
would have been able to stifle the demands for protection 
on the part of industries threatened by the tremendous 
influx of imported goods. But when the major pert of ex-
port trade in agricultural products was so inadvertant1y 
cut off, the opposition to trade restriction breathed it-
self out naturally. In this sanse the protective system 
as it manifested itself in 1816 was an effort to preserve 






~he Tariff of 1816. 
On December 5, 1815, President Madison sent his 
1 address to Congress. On the subject of import duties the 
fO,llowing paragraph has been selected as reflective of 
the sense of the nation at that time. 
"However wise the theory may be which leaves to 
the sagacity and interest of individuals the application 
of their industry and resources, there are in this, as in 
other cases, exceptions to the general rule. Besides the 
condition which the theory itself implies, of a reciprocal 
adoption by other nations, experience teaches us that so 
many circumstances must concur in introducing and matur-
ing manufacturing establishments, especially of the more 
complicated kinds, that a country may remain long without 
them, although suffiCiently advanced, and in some respects 
even peculiarly fitted for carrying them on with success. 
Under circumstances giving powerful impulse to manufactur-
ing industry, it has made among us a progress and exhibi-
ted an effiCiency, which justify and belief that, with a 
protection not more than that which is due to the 1nter-
prising citizens whose interests afe now at stake, it will 
become at an early day, not only safe against occasional 
lAnnals of the Congress of the United states. 14th Con-
gress--lst Session. 16. 1~4. 
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competitions from abroad but a source of domestic wealth 
and even of external commerce. In selecting the branches 
more especially entitled to the public patronage, a pre-
ference is obviously claimed by such as will relieve the 
United states from a dependence on foreign supplies, ever 
subject to casual failures, for articles necessary for 
public defence, or connected with the primary wants of 
individuals. It will be an additional recommendation of 
particular manufactures where the materials for them are 
extensively drawn from our agriculture, and consequently 
impart and insure to that great fund of national prosper-
ity and independence an encouragement which cannot fail 
to be rewarded." 
We find here the chief arguments for the tariff 
policies which directed legislation during the years fol-
lowing the War of 1812. Briefly they axe the argument 
that tariff helps young industry, that it tends to develop 
national self-sufficiency, and that the further industrl-
ali§ation of t~is country would lead to a balance between 
agricultural and manufacturing pursuits. The ideal sought 
was a wealthy well ooordinated nation in which the raw 
material extractors end agriculturalists were to bu1' man-
ufactures and manufacturers were to become a market for 
raw materials and foodstuffs. 
Moreover the privations attendant upon war were 
familiar to the people, and there was considerable reactio.l 
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toward a plan of economy which would render the nation 
less susceptible to them should there come in the future 
other serious strictures of COmmerg8. 
There was not any great sectional division of 
the country upon the tariff at this period in history. 
Agriculture and manufacturing were both confident that in 
the encouragement of manufactures they would both be bene-
fitted. 
There had begun to be at this time a considerabl 
degree of separation and specialization in the pursuits of 
farming end manu.£actures. Muoh of the early colonial 
woolen industry was in the line of home spinning and while 
this type of production was encouraged by the same condi-' 
tions of stricture which were attendant upon the trouble 
with France and England its growth was not commensurate 
1 
with the growth of other manufactures. 
The impetus given to manufactures by the tariff 
of 1816 was not great. In the present day concept of pro-
tection it could not be regarded as rendering very great 
protection but in light of the fact that it was virtually 
unapposed it must be regarded as the concept of protection 
at that time. The duties ran about 25% ad valorum. Duties 
on cotton were 25% with all cotton costing less than 26 
cents a yard valued at 25,; duties on wool were the same; 
and on iron, hammered bar 45, per hundred, rolled bar 
lAgricultuxe in Northern ~ ~ 250. Bidwell and Falcon. 
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$1.50 per hundred, and pig iron 2~fo ad valorum.1 
As to just what the result of this legislation 
was it is difficult to say. There was a considerable 
growth in industry during the period up to 1833 during 
which there was a constant increase and adjustment of the 
tariff. The factory system largely replaced the home as 
the producer of cloths particularly and there came to be 
a clear line of demarkation between indistrial pursuits 
and agricultural pursuits. 2 As the various lines of en-
terprise crystalized apart the country began to resemble 
the self-sufficient nation, balanced within itself spoken 
of by Madison in 1816. The tariff of 1816 was in force 
with minor changes until 1824. There had been numerous 
attempts meanwhile to have the whole system revamped. 
For the first time the new government was meeting with 
some of the problems that arise out of the tariff. 
The English manufacturers had perSisted in 
undermining the system in two ways. They would declare 
their goods in as of lower value than they actually were 
thus receiving a smaller ad valorum tax. The difference 
in price was settled privately between the importer and 
the purchaser. In addition to this the shippers and mer-
chants of England devined the demand by their orders from 
1Taussig. United States History of Tariff. 31, 40, 51.'14 
2Agriculture in Northern America. 250. 1820-1860. 
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~he important duties were at this time upon 
woollens, iron, cotton bagging and hemp chiefly, and of 
course upon many other things as well. The woollens in-
dustry was going through a period of 'considerable distress 
because the poorly equipped mills could not compete with 
the more modern mills abroad especially since their raw 
materials' were more costly. 
The following comparison of duties will show the 
material changes in the act of 1824. 
A Table of llet Revenues From 
Before 1824 
rate in ¢ duties $ 
Duck: Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ravens •••••••••••••••••••• 






Brown Russia ••••••••••••• 




bar rolled ••••••••••••••• 
hammered ••••••••••••••••• 
sheet, rod, and hoop ••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 














• •••• 57 .,164 
• • • • • 39,233 
• • • • • 3,832 
• •••• 5,966 
• • • • • 1,352 
••••• 24,922 
• •••• 14,00'1 
••••• 110,053 
• •••• 519,327 
• •••• 89,592 
• •••• 18,570 
• •••• 98,739 
• • • • • 
Duck: Holland •••••••••••••••••• 250 ••••• 922.50 
Cotton Bagging: •••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••• 80~900~13 
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America and often sent similar goods at the same time to 
be sold at auction at a lower price. Thus not only did 
they undersell the American but they contrived to take his 
market almost order by order. l ~h8 period covered by the 
Tariff of 1816 cannot be said to be a boom period for mer-
chants or manufacturers on the coast but in those inland 
regions there did exist a far greater protection than im-
port duties for the goods of importers could not be shippee 
very far over land. 
The discussion of the tariff gave rise early to 
the sectional division of the country.2 The New England 
section whose chief financial interest lay in commerce 
and ship building naturally regarded the tariff as 1nim. 
ical to their interests while Kentucky was in favor of 
tariffs on hemp and cordage since those things were chieflJ 
produced there. The growth of iron manufactuxes caused 
Pennsylvania to be enlisted with the protectionists while 
New York and Connecticut were interested primarily in 
tariffs on raw wool. The South feared that the resumption 
of import trade would cause her stock of specie to be de-
pleted so they favored the proposed duties.3 
lBolles' Financial Historg of the United states, 




Financial Historl £! !a! United states. 1'15. 1922 
Wool Growing and the Tariff. 45. 1910. ----- .- - -- ---
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Table (continued)l 
rate in ¢ duties 
Iron, Muskets • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 150 • •••• 3,748 
Rt~les • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 160 ••••• 3 
Mill saws • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 100 • •••• 1,274 
Castings • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 75 • •••• 7,979 
Sheet and Hogs • • • • • • • • • • • 250 • •••• 31,550 
Pig • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 50 • •••• 6,294 
Bar, rolled • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 150 ••••• 87,430 
hammered • • • • • • • • • • • • 75 ••••• 28,484 
hammered •••••••••••• 90 •••• 120,625 
Steel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 100 ••••• 19,851 
Hemp • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 175 ••••• 137,953 
Hemp • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 150 ••••• 328 
In the years following the enactment of 1824 
there was considerable agitation for higher duties. At th 
same time the serious division of sectional opinion made 
it difficult for the representatives to discern the will 
of the people. The candidates for president were in favor 
of some tariffs because they felt the considerable pres-
sure which industries were already bringing to bear upon 
the government. 
The election of Jackson placed in the seat of 
power a remarkable man but a political enigma very diffi-
cult of solution. No one knew exactly where he stood upon 
the tariff question. The tariff of 1828 which bears to 
this day the name "Tariff of Abominations" has been var-
iously criticized. Its actual effect was to place the 
1 
Reports of Sec. of Treasury. Vol 2. 288-289. Blair and 
Rives. Washington, 1837. 
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duties on raw materials very high without placing com-
mensurate duties on manufactures. The result was a high 
tariff but one which failed to benefit the manufacturer. 
As a politioal measure it cannot be doubted 
that this was one of the great strategems of polit1cal 
history. It waS natural that the South should be opposed 
to the tariff but they alone could do little about it so 
this act was intended to turn the manufacturers against 
high tariffs. In a measure it was successful since it 
was followed by gradually decreasing rates until 1842.1 
Duties upon raw wool were materially altered. 
Instead of the duty of 30% ad valorum as in the act of 
1824 it was changed to an ad valorum duty of 40% to which 
was added a specific duty of 4¢ per pound. Woolens re-
ceived a considerably larger duty than they had had but 
the effect was not to increase their protection since the 
duties on raw wool ~rom which they manufactured their 
woollens had been increased so much that prices were mater 
ially higher. Chester Whitney Wright in his prize winning 
study of "Wool Growing and the Tariff" quotes from Niles' 
register referring to the tariff of 1828 as "A bill for 
the slaughter of sheep; and to prevent the growth of wool 
in United states and for other purposes. MX.Tause1g 
quotes Webster as feeling that the ad valorum du~y of 
ITaussig t F. W • United states Tariff History,. 95-101. 
1914. 
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about 50% (figuring in the compound duty) was not more 
1 than a compensation for the duties on raw wool. 
It is at this period that the fierce sectional 
differences began to arise which are later to cUlminate 
in the Civil war.2 
The vested interests "argument arose in regard 
to the degree of protection. Those industries which had 
originally been enabled to exist because they were pro-
tected insisted that they had the right to the continuatio 
of that protection. The South was at variance with this 
view not so much from political reasons as for economic 
ones. The country was divided into two sections by the 
nature of their trade. The South produced those agricul-
tural staplea--cotton t rice, and tobacco in exportable 
quantities. These products were sold upon the world mar-
ket at a price determined by simple supply and demand for-
ces. When the South bought goods it was upon the protects 
market at home. It was upon the American market and price 
were higher than abroad. Hence the South received for her 
cotton which was grown in this country by slave labor and 
at a cost proportionately high only what the world market 
offered, but her purchases were made in the protected mar-
1 Taussig, F. W. United states Tariff Historz. 101. 1914. 
2Treatment of these differences may be found in Sohon1er 
History ~ the United States, ~. Vol IV. 55-66. 
and in Bolles Financial History of United states, 1891. 
Vol II. 413-421. -- ----
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ket at home. It was upon the American market and prices 
were higher than abroad. Hence the South received for her 
cotton which was grown in this country by slave labor at 
a cost proportionally high only what the world market of-
fered but her purchases were made in the proteoted market. 
It is hard to see any real benefit for the South under 
such conditions. 
The lIorth, however, was placed differently. 
She could sell much of her manufaotures in her home market 
at high prices because of the tariff. In the years betwee~ 
1809-1860 there were two trends in Amerioa. The one the 
fight of the North for industrialization aided by protect-
ion, the other the growth of Agriculture in the South aide~ 
by slavery and the invention of the cotton gin. Two poles 
of economics, an exporting section which could profit by 
free imports but whose prosperity was threatened by con-
tinued protection; an infant industry section which could 
not readily survive free imports whose prosperity, its 
people felt, was dependent upon continued protection. 
So ~nsistent was the demruld of the South for 
lower duties that there was enacted in 1832 a new tariff 
which enlarged the free list and made several material 
alterations in the duties which it retained. After the 
fiasco of 1828 this law was the embodiment of the ideals 
of the protectionists. Mr. Clay, the proponent of the 
so-called lfAmerican System" was instrumental in bringing 
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about this legislation and Jackson was glad to sign it. 
Mr. Taussig refers to this act as one putting 
the protectionist policy in the shape which the protec-
tionists hoped it would maintain in the future. However 
this law which gave protection sufficient to woolens, iron. 
hemp and other important industrial products met with con-
siderable opposition in the South. Calhoun, the nullifi-
cationist led in South Carolina a fight to rulllUI the act. 
This state declared that the act was unconstitutional and 
had no force within her boundaries. l Andrew Jackson 
immediately put the machinery into motion to coerce the 
state into obedience. The Carolinians seeing that the 
president meant business, and lured by hope of compro-
mise withdrew their nullification acts. The fruit of 
these controversies was the Compromise Tariff of 1833. 
lSchlessinger. Political and Social History of the 
United states, 1829-1925.~4-37. 1925. -- ---
PART FIVE 
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starting with the 1832 act as a basis the com-
promise act proposed to reduce the tariffs horizontal17 
to twenty per cent ad valorum. One tenth of the tax over 
20~ was to be removed on January 1, 1834 and one tenth 
each even year until in 1840 four tenths of the amount 
over 20% would be removed thea the other 81x tenths were 
to be removed, three tenths in Ju,,1842, and the duty 
upon July 1, 1842, was to beeome 20%. The South and South· 
west showed their approval of this measure by reoording 
only two dissenting votes in the House. 
By sections the vote in the House follows:1 
!e Favor Opposed 
New England ••••••••• 1~ •••••••• 28 
Middle states ••••••• 24 •••••• 47 
West •••••••••••••••• 10 •••••• 8 
South and Southwest. 75 •••••• 2 
Total •••••••••• lI§ •••••• 85 
The period covered by the compromise tariff of 
1833 was one of the most critioa1 of Amerioan history. It 
can be said to be extremely important in that it brings to 
light some of the controlling trends of the time. Presi-
'ent Jackson, one of the most dramatic figures in American 
history, set out to destroy the United states Bank. Hold-
ing it to be the instrument of the rich for the oppression 
of the poor he went before the country with an agress1ve 
intention to defeat the renewal of its oharter. After 
1 
Dewey. Financial Histo~l ~ United states. 187. 1924. 
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carefully selecting a secretary of treasury willing to 
help him--Roger B. TaneY'-.... he began to withdraw the govern-
ment funds from the bank. Oertain other banks which he 
ohose were uaed as depositories for these funds. The re-
sult of thus removing these funds from a oonservative in-
stitution to place them in small, carelessly managed banks 
was to extend credit far beyond the sone of Safety.l 
The danger was heightened by a law for distribu-
tion of surplus national revenues among the several states. 
~his law called for the withdrawal of large deposita and 
its effect upon credit was tmmediate constriction. Added 
to this was the SpeCie Circular which caused only gold to 
be aocepted in payments for land purchased from the govern .... 
mente Naturally enough busine8s followed the precedent of 
government and the rapidly expanding enterprises had their 
foundations suddenly removed from benea.th them. 
Van Buren taking offioe ~ust in time to receive 
the deluge had his hands occupied with the drastic finan-
cial moves necessary to rescue the oountry from industrial 
depression. ne followed out the moves of Jackson, worked 
for the establishment of a sep~at. United states treasur7 
for storage of monies, and held to a liberal b&nilng po1107 
The finanoial debaole for which he was in no measure res-
ponsible brought about his defeat at the hands of the Whig. 
l".rtenbaker. ~ .American People. Chap XVII. 
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who had chosen as their leaders General Harrison and JOM 
!yler. Almost immediately upon his inauguration President 
Harrison, fatigued by his ~ourney to Washington fell ill 
and died leaving the Presidency to John ~yler. In 1841 
the government revenue·s were not sufficient to defray the 
expenses of government. The provision to distribute the 
prooeeds from sales of public lands which had come into 
force under Jackson was still curtailing revenue from that 
source and the compromise act of 1833 had finally reduced 
the tariff horizontally to 20% aa. valo'rum. It seemed im-
perative that some immediate action be taken. The Whigs 
set about to devise a bill raising the general revenues to 
the level of January 1, 1840, and retaining the distribu-
tion clause. Tyler, while he was in sympathy with the 
tariff measure vetoed the bill on acoount of the distribu-
tion clause. A bili known as the "Little Tariff Bill" was 
then proposed to put the duties up to what they had bean 
on June first and to keep the distribution law active. 
This was also vetoed. Tyler followed this action by veto-
ing another bill similar to the first proposed bill. Fin-
ally, the co~ess submitted the same bill without the 
clause for redistribution of land revenues t and Tyler sign-
ed it. This bill provided for a return to the rates of 
Jan. 1t 1840 under the compromise tariff exoept that the 
duties subject to ad val.rum duties of 20% were to be 
raised to 30%. This act was passed largely out of the 
4'1 
desire of the Whigs to create an issue and as Calhoun has 
it that the Act of 1842 was passed not so much in compli-
ance with the wishes of manufacturers as because the poli-
ticians wanted an issue.1 
This act was superceded by the Aot of 1846 for 
two reasons. It had not in the first place arisen from 
any unified or persistent demand on the part of manufac-
turers and it was returning more than enough revenue to 
defray the cost of government. The Act of 1846 has been 
loosely termed a "free trade tariff." The confusion in 
regard to it has, it is likely, arisen from the fact that 
it tried to combine the purposes of protection with a som8~ 
what more remunerative revenue arrangement than had before 
characterized the various acts and it was in this senae a 
tariff for revenue. The principle.s upon which this bill 
was created arose from the fertile mind of Secretary of the 
Treasury Walker who delineate these princlples. 2 
"1st. That no more money should be collected than 
i8 necessary for the wants of the govermnent, 
economically administered. 
"2nd. That no duty be imposed on any article above 
the lowest rate which will yield the largest 
amount of revenue. 
"3rd. That below such rate discrimination may be 
made descending, in the scale of duties; or, 
for imperative reasons, the article may be 
~CMaster. HistLti of the peolle of ~ United states. 
Vol. VII, ohap. IT: ~ 191 • . 
2 
Reports of the Secretary of Treasury. Vol. V. 4. 1845. 
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placed in the list of those free from all dut7. 
"4th. That the maximum revenue duty should be im-
posed upon lUXU%1es. 
"6th. That all minimums, and all specific duties, 
should be abolished, and ad valorum duties 
substituted in their place--care being taken 
to guard against fraudulent invoices and 
undervaluation, and to assess the duty upon 
the actual market value. 
"6th. That the duty shou1d be so imposed as to 
operate as equally as possible throughout 
the Union, discriminating neither for nor 
against any class or section." 
In this powerful argument against protection of 
manu£acturers to the detriment of the consumer Mr. Walker 
argues that the consumer pays a tax double that of col-
lected duties in order to support certain industries. Be 
derives the figure by aS8um~g that the duty is added to 
the domestic product in terms of price. Further he holds 
that there is a point at which a duty may be low enough to 
permit unrestricted trade and at the same time be at the 
maximum of revenue producing. It was upon this theoretic~ 
point that the tariffs were to be placed. 
Inasmuch as duties ran as high as 100% this bill, 
it is readily observable, cannot be regarded as creating 
free trade. 
The bill had one innovation. In all previous 
tariffs duties had been'levied separately. This one di-
vided dutiable artioles into sche~u1es lettered from A 
to H and levying duties of A., 100%; B. 40%: 0. 30%; D, 25~i 
E, 20%: F. 16%: G, lO~; and H. 6%. 
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In the report of 1845 we fin! wool valued at 
less than 7¢ per pound dutied at 5% and other wool at 30% 
and 3, per pound; in the report of 1847 we f~nd wool lutie 
at 30% ad valorum as is true also of almost all types of 
iron, "bars, bolts, loop., pigs, rods, slabs, etc." whioh 
were rated at precisely the same rate in the Aot of 1842. 
Nor is there any material change in unmanufactured hemp 
while cotton is taken from a ~ duty to the free list. 
The returns in revenue from the Aot of 1842 in 
1845 were $2'1,528.112.'101 while the new tariff cut this 
figure to $23.'147,864.66 in 1847.2 
As far as can be 4etermined3 the Democrats were 
not greatly in favor of the Act of 1846 and it met with 
4 
considerable opposition from manufacturers. Bollss fur-
ther reports that the period from 1846 to 1857 was a gloo 
one for manufaotures. 5 However other historians refer to 
this period as one of unusual prosperity and expansion. 
1Reports of Sec. of Treas. of United State •• Vol V. ,. 
2Reports of Sec. of Treas, of United states. Vol VI. 119 
iMcMaster. History of PeoEle of United states. Vol VII. 
421. 1914. 
4 Bolles. Financial Histor~ of ~ United state., ~-
~. Vol 2. 454-468. 1 91: . 
5Taussig. Tariff History S! ~ United states. 122. 1914. 
Schlessinger. A Political and Social History of the 
United states, T829.19!5. III. 1926. -- -----
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While the low tariff rates may have oontribute' 
materially to this period of good tim88 other factors were 
at work such as the rapi' ••• tward expanaion, the westward 
movements in 1849 lue 'to liscovery of go14 in Oelifornia, 
the rapi.. diseovery of new industrial methods and the ex. 
tension of transportation 87ste... fhe improvement in ta-
terilational trade may be t,..o.' direotly to this tariff. 
As Secretary Walker antic1p.te, the duties of Brit.a llPOD. 
foodstuffs .ere large17 reao"., and in the years fromlS.' 
to 185'1 the importl and expoZ"ta of the country very nearlJ' 
tr8"led.1 
Along with other industries this was a pre.p.r •• 
perlod for wool growers althou.gh it did not ahare prolper-
i t7 quite in proportion 1;'0 other ag.r1a12l. tura! products.2 
The cotton industry likewi.. experienced • oonsiderable 
growth during this perloa..1 
A new tariff aot lowering the schedule C which 
oovered the group of thiDg8 protected fer the lake ot 
8't1m.ulating industr7 fro. I~ to 24~ and seheAul, D. pre-
viously 25% waa reluoea to l~. !h... reductions which 
covere' manufactures of iron. woolens, and cotton were 
1 Coman. Industrial Hi8torl .2,!l1nited stat.a. 266.15'. 
1922. 
2Smith• The Tariff 011 Wool. 106. - --
Sfaussig. Tariff Hi,torl !! United state.. 140. 1914. 
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aooompan18' b7 corresponding reductions in raw material •• 
This tariff did not materially change the 8i tuatloD alth .... ~h 
the year that , itbeeame a law was a severe one in which th. 
' bottoms literally dropped out of the overaxpan4ed indu,~ 
trial' organizations. !rhus endS the per1od1842.186'1 char. 
acteriz.' by low tariffs and heavy import and export tra4ej 
On the whole it was a period of lUlUSual busines8 activity 
and confidenoe in the .01Ul~.88 of the country'. eoonomio 
condition. In 185'1 there w .. alopte' an aven lower .eh.4~ 
ule of .duties. Following 41%80t17 were the •• vere finan-
eialdisturbano8. of l8S' •• I. lome not very 4isoerning 
politicians have regar4e4 th11 •• the culmination of the 
eT11sof low tariffs. .lh1l. the flow of golcl to other 
oountries in pa1D1ent for :1a.P'J','8 m~ have been in a meaaur. 
due to the tariff, and while theoreiit situation ••• 1111-
doubteelly weakened by. the ,,,oTal ·ofmuch of iteprecio1l8 
metal foundation still there are other faotors so tmportaat 





As .aa true of most o~ the panic. in .... rioan 
histo~7 this on. was bae.4 iB everexpanaioB and .eak.ne' 
credit. When a nation', industrie. are working ant ex-
panding productien on 01'.41t: wh.n the b", public i. 
buying with ore4it; Wh64 pablle and private enterprise 
are rooted in the general eonf1lenee in the likelihood 
that good times will continue th.n a ohange in tariff 87 
be the oatalytic to bring .bout finanoial dis8ster. 
There is little evilence to indicate that there 
was al17 determined '.aire to return to a high protective 
po1ic7. The measure of 1815' 8t&784 in force until 1861 
when b.cause it did not or •• te sufficient rev«nue it ... 
supercedea.. by the .01'1'111 "&'01;. ftds act was a return. to 
the general duti •• of 1841. Ipeeifio duties were r8sort." 
to in many oases as 8 react10n against the entirely a4 
val 0 rum schedules of the aote of 1846 ani 1857. !his. bill 
was not a war measure but siapl,. a bill for the gaining of 
greater revenae. to 'efra7 the inoreasing 008ts of govern-
ment and to P&.7 off the 1;1'8"111'7 aote. 1Sllle' to counterao1 
the 'eficits during the 78ar8 oOTere' by the Aot of 1857. 
It dil not. however, ••• t the aounting costs of carr71Dl 
Oll the war. Ia 186' ... another b111 which m&t8r1&117 
raise4 the tar1ffs on alae.t all oOmmodities. llot onl7 
were tariffs increase' for the Bake of increaSing revenu •• 
but they were also ra1 •• ' te co.pensate BaBRfaotuzers tor 
the adtel cost of selling goods which at the outset were 
54 
taxed heaTil7 in exo188 tax.a. 
In explaining the nut few years of tariff his-
tory it 1s neoessary to feel ':11. 1ntena1 t7 of American 
patriotism at the ttme. .ot oaly were the people williDg 
to oheerfully pay their ahue I" the tax.. for oarrying on 
war but they were willing to beer eyen sr.ater burd.ns. 
War times always bring about 00.41t1.088 001141101.,.. t. 1ID-
llaual saorifice and .8rvlce oa. the :part of the o1tt •• .nr7. 
It has an ana •• thetic effeot .,.. the oivic al.rt.... of 
the people which makea it pO •• 11)1. to il'18t1tute 87st.O 
which uni.r or4in81'7 01" .... ' ..... would reoeive little 
favor. !his WaB the oa •• with 'he .orrl11-8te.,.8na !arlff 
of 1864. 
£8 has been 8&i4. the aot of 1861 re8tor.4 the 
dutie. to about the level ", 1846 exoept spe.ifle duties 
.ere somewhat higher ill .oae cu... !he Act of 1862 rai •• 
the dllt18. to an aver..,. of ., __ and these were further 
raised in 1864 to 4'~_ the 4ut 7 on »lg 1ron became t9 per 
ton; on iron rod8 tID Jar tOB; on wool val •• 4 from 18 to 
24 cents per pou4 6 oa.'.; oa wool valuea. from 24: 1;0 sa 
cents per pound.. 10 e.n"8~:r paaa" ana. 4~ ad Valorum.1 
!hese high4.tiea .ere ~u.t1f1.d from two s~an'­
,8uta. !he gov.r .... '~ •• 1~ ae.4ed a441t1onal revena.. 
:tor carrying it throqbithe. eXpeu1 'Ve war. boiae tax •• 
.. ......• . 1 
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had been levied on most manufactured goods thus raising 
their selling prices and defeating in a measure the pro-
teotion of the tariff sinoe imported goods did not have 
to pay suoh taxes. So the tariff act was promulgated with 
the idea of levTing a oommensurate tax upon imports thus 
virtual17 retaining the same degree of proteotion. These 
two ideas were combined to produce the most stringent pro-
tection up to this time in United States history. 
When the war was over both of the causes for thi 
extraordinarily high tariff were soon removed. From 1866 
to 1872 there were gradual reductions of the exoise taxes 
except on a few luxuries. Further the revenues were more 
than sufficient to defray the diminishing oosts of govern-
ment. However, the real effect of removing the excise 
taxes was to inorease the degree of protection afforded 
by the law of 1864. In that sense the period following 
the war may be marked as one of ever increasing protection 
Coupled with the natural expansion of the war 
the tariff caused many industries to spring uP. and much 
expansion to occur which it is not likely would have 00-
curred at this time without protection. Crops had bean 
meagre in Europe with the result that the Agricultural 
products found an unusually ready market there while dis-
coveries of new copper and iron deposits as well as know-
ledge for utilization of petroleum acted to insure materi& 
prosperity. 
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During such times it is difficult if not im-
possible to make seriOUS changes in the industrial policie 
of the government. By 1872 however there had grown to be 
a perennial surplus in the treasury of over $100,000,000 
and it was seen that there must be some kind of action to 
out down redundant revenues. There were two billa under 
consideration. One, the Bouse bill, was designed to lower 
almost all duties and those upon suoh important things as 
oottons, woolens, iron and wool were to be lowered about 
20%. The Senate bill proposed a ten per cent horizontal 
revision downward with tea and coffee on the free list. 
While there was oonsiderable spirit for the 
House bill the manufacturers were able to unite upon the 
less drastic Senate bill and secured its passage. 
Mr. TaUSSig's diSoussion
l 
brings a noteworthy 
point to light. In reducing the tariff because revenues 
were too great the general reduotions on protected article. 
was slight while duties upon coffee and tea which could no1 
be grown in this country were revoked altogether. This 
marks a new phase of the tariff situation inasmuoh as there 
is no longer even a pretense that the tariff is ohiefly fOI 
revenue. The assumption now is that the chief purpose of 
the tariff is protection. 




A number of things oonspired to bring about the 
panio of 18'15. The panic may be said to be due to over-
expansion and the inevitable oredit shortage. The rail-
roads had built far beyond the needs of the time as had 
almost every trade and industry. Money was easily borrowel 
and there existed an overweening confidence in the contin-
ued prosperity. New York banks had invested rather heavi1l 
in the future of America, in industrial and railway stooks 
Foreign capital had contributed largely to the credit of 
the banks so when a panic oaused the Vienna Bourse to with· 
draw rapidly the American banks were hard pressed to cope 
with the situation and finally the backers of the Northern 
Paoifio Railway. Jay Cooke and Company went to the wall 
and the whole interrelated oredit system was shaken to its 
foundations. Failure followed failure and the whole natiol 
was thrown into a state from whioh it took five years to 
recover. Although it would take oonsiderable patience and 
ingenUity to oonneot this series of events oausally with 
any changes in the tariff it was ohosen as one of the in-
evitable results of the 10% horizontal downward revision. 
18'15 the Aot of 18'12 was repealed leaving the law of 1864 
in foro.e without material ohange from war times. These 
duties were oontinued until 1885 with oertain changes whiol 
1 
will appear in the following discussion. 
1 
Tauesig. y:,. S. Tariff History_ Chap 111. 194-229. 1914, 
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In 1867 an as8ociation of wool growers and manu-
facturers succeeded in getting a bill passed which involve~ 
a feature called compensation. In this bill we find a 
principle first used in the Act of 1864. It assumes that 
the protection of raw materials adds to the price of dO-
mestic raw materials. hence. the manufacturer must have 
even higher duties upon his finished products because ther 
must compete. were it not for the tariff. with foreign pro 
ducts manufactured from cheaper raw materials. 
The duty on wool was rendered higher by the re. 
tention of the 10% ad valorum which had already been added 
to compensate for excise taxes. Further the low duty clas 
o:fwool was merged with a higher duty class thus causing 
the duty on the lower grades of wool. those most used in 
the United states. to be prohibitory. The compensating 
duty failed to take into consideration the fact that much 
woolen goods is not all wool but that cotton and other 
materials are frequently miXed in. The tariff in this 
case is rendered even more effective. When these factors 
are added to the 25% ad valorum which the manufacturers 
desired sheerly as protection or as net effective protee-
tion we readily perceive that the woolen manufacturers 
were able to get a considerable measure of what they 801lsJlt. 
In 1869 copper came in for its special share of 
legislation and iron followed in 1870. Other special taP 
terests. some of which were small and isolated s01lgb\ aDd 
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reoeived speoial attention during this period. 
In reviewing this period of high tariffs there 
are some trends worth noting. One is the diffioulty of 
lowering a duty onoe established. There is no doubt that 
proteotion during this period was oarried to a rather ab-
surd extreme, but it was a period of growth and expansion 
during which there was little olamor for changes in legis-
lation exoept on the part of the industries which have 
just been mentioned. Further, it is to be noted that the 
tenaoity with which industries hold to proteotion inorease 
as time passes sinoe they do sometimes live and grow by 
the proteotion afforded by a oareless and benevolent gov-
ernment. The tendanoy of the government to be influen4ed 
by manufacturing interests is also noteworthy as are the 
arguments for the extension of that proteotion. We find 
that the industries are willing to admit that their ex-
istenoe does and perhaps always will depend upon pro-
teotion. The argument veers from national self-auffioieno , 
the establishment of key industries, and the oultivating 
of a home market to the contiDnation of the profits of 
industry when that industry ia onoe established. We oan-
not fail to note that the tariff changes of this period 
came as the result of the efforts of in4ividual industrt •• 
to seoure benefits for themselves. 
As had been the oase with almost all puvi01l8 
tariff aot. the Aot of 1883 had a direot connection witk 
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the revenue situation. While the tariff of 1864 with the 
ohang,. already referre4 to was satisfaotory to most of 
the manufacturing interests it was patent that some change 
must be made to reduce the surplus revenues. So in 1882 
a tariff commission was appointed to make a specialized 
study of the needs for revenue and the needs of industry. 
This first Tariff Commi8sion 'is an example of the fetters 
which bind the hands of reason in tariff discussions;Sch-
lessinger in his Sooial ~ Folitioal History ~ United 
states, ~-~ notes that -four of the nine members of 
this commission were positively identified with protected 
or vested interests, one, in particular, John L. Hayes, 
Chairman, was also Secretary of the National Association 
of Wool Manufacturers. out of this commission came re-
commendations for an average tariff cut of from 2~ to 25% 
By means of ingenious Juggling of specific and ad valorum 
duties the representatives of districts having special in-
terests were enabled to nullify the reduotive effects of 
the proposed bill and as a result the protection given in 
the previous act was not 8ubstantially changed. 
The circumstances surrounding its passage are in 
teresting inasmuch as they explain in a measure the presen 
of such a statute upon the books. It cannot be said that 
there was any marked enthusiasm for the bill in its final 
form. It was reported to a Conference Committee composed 
of members of the two houses. This committee ohanged the 
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whole tenor of the bill before reporting it to the Senate 
and the Bouse. This may be well illustrated by reference 
to a speech by Mr. Morrison: "The office and duty of a 
conferenoe oommittee i8 to adjust the differenoe between 
two disagreeing houses. This Bouse had decided that bar 
iron of the middle class should pay $20 a ton; the Senate 
that it was to pay $20.16 per ton. The gentlemen of the 
conference committee reconciled this difference--how? By 
raising bar-iron (of this class) above both Bouse and 
Senate fo $22.40. The Tariff Commission reported that the 
tariff on iron ore should be 5~ per ton. The Senate said 
it should be 50¥ a ton. The Bouse said it should be 50¥ 
a ton. Gentlemen of the conference committee reconciled 
this agreement of the Bouse. Senate and Tariff Commission 
into a disagreement and made the duty on iron ore '5¥ per 
ton .••••••••• _1 
1 
TaUSSig in a rather oarefUl study of this aot 
has pointed out some of the strategems used to defeat any 
effective reduotions on protected materials. In the dis-
cussion of the war tariff it will be recalled that there 
were compound duties on woolens. ~se assessed a specific 
duty and an ad valorum duty. Originally it was intended 
that the ad valorum duty should represent the degree of 
real protection riven. It was derived from two factors, 
lQuoted from Taussig. U. S. Tariff History. 233 quoting 
from Nelson's unjust 1l'arI'ff taw. 2!-23. Original aource 
not referred to. 
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the amount of protection purely as protection plus an 
added degree of protection supposedly neoeesitated by 
duties or raw '001. fhe speoific duty was levied chiefly 
to offset the effect of internal revenue laws incidental 
to the financing of the Civil War. In changing these 
duties in this act a return was made to the ad valorum 
method used before; the speoific duties were dropped and 
the ad valorum duty was raised. It may be readily observe 
that there was no real effect from this sort of reduotion. 
Those lower grades of woolena retained a tariff high eno~ 
to be prohibitive and the higher grades, taxed acoording 
to their value felt the full force of the increased ad 
valorum duty. Duties on raw wool were lowered. In this 
case the ad valorum duties were removed and specific dutie. 
were retained. Again in this case the duty retained is· 
etill sufficient to protect the 1merican wool industry. 
The same was true of steel. While the specific 
duties upon most types of st8~1 were lowered there were 
certain classes which had been subjected to a ~ ad val-
orum tax which under this act were burdened with the same 
speoific duties as the types which had been enumerated in 
the previous bill. The effect of this was to lower the 
tariff on these articles such as ingots and rolled bars. 
but to raise considerably the duties on the previously 
unenumerated articles. 
Similar changes occurred in cotton and other 
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commodities. The general effect of the bill was not the 
reduction of raising of the tariff but rather a revamping 
process in which the duties became on the whole a little 
less remunerative but in which the principle of protection 
was retained with at least as great, if not with increased 
force. 
The votel on this bill in the senate as it orig-
inally came from the committee was 42-19 in favor but afte] 
the conference committee had revised it the vote was only 
32-30 in favor and one senator remarked that he wished he 
had not voted for it. 2 
There can be no doubt that in spirit this act 
failed to follow the recommendations of the Commission, fOl, 
where the committee had proposed substantial reductions of 
20% to 25% the final la. as passed reduced the tariff but 
little and prevented in a large measure any reduction whicl 
could have really benefitted the consumer. In spite of the 
fact that this act was received with no marked degree of 
enthusiasm, in spite of the fact that it was the product 
of very doubtful legislative processes it continued for 
some time to muster sufficient support to prevent its re-
vision. 
The nature of the problem involved at this time 
ITaussig, F. W. Tariff History £! the United states. 233. 
1914. 
2 
Dewey. Financial History of the United states. 422. 
1922. 
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had already begun to assume quite di~~erent aspects than 
at any previous period in history. ~he entire problem of 
the tariff had begun to be ramified with two groups of cir-
cumstances which clearly demark the early period o~ legis-
lation ~rom the period which has c~inated in the Hawley-
Smoot tari~~. Various industries had grown toiimmense 
proportions. Closely organized, employing many men, ex-
tending into many states, they had begun to ~eel the thrill 
o~ power. Their attitude had gradually changed ~rom one oj 
the humble seeker ~or governmental ~avors to the one o~ 
demanding those favors with a voice that brooked little 
opposition. Already they had begun to keep an establish-
ment at the seat o~ government to in~luence the vote in 
matters concerning their business. Not just a few indus-
tries were doing this but many and the result was as has 
been seen--an act which satis~ied ~ew and which was openly 
and unashamedly aimed at keeping the protected industries 
sa~e ~rom the ordinary risks of business. 
Even be~ore this time unusual i~luences had been 
brought to bear to cause legislation to favor particular 
industries, as, witness the Woolens act o~ 1867, but the 
efforts were not based upon individual need so much as com-
munity and national benefits. Let us say that whether or 
not industries were purely selfish be~ore they had at least 
tried to put up social arguments ~or protection. Further 
the advantages of trading ~ree of duty were coming to be 
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given some consideration. America had begun to recognize 
that other nations' trade might be diverted by our tariffs 
just as our trade was averted from them by their tariffs. 
These factors enter into the making of the act of 1890. 
While President Cleveland was defeated for the 
presidency in 1888 his campaign on the tariff had far reacb~ 
ing effects. His opponent regarded this as a rebuff to the 
downward revision supporters and immediately set into mo-
tion the machinery for upward revision of the tariff. 
The McKinley Tariff Act was a distinct upward re-
vision raising the average level of duties to 49.5%.1 
The duties on woo1ens as usual were regarded as 
very important. On the tr~ee classes of wool which had 
been scheduled in the previous tariff, combing, clothing, 
and carpet wool the duties were changed. On combing wool 
and clothing wool the changes were negligible while on 
carpet wool an ad valorum duty of 32% to 5~~ was imposed. 
2 
Taussig notes that this was probably done because manu-
facturers had been using some of this grade of wool for 
making woolen cloths. However protective it may have been 
as a measure to keep this low grade wool from competing wit 
higher grades raised in this country it did work consider-
able hardship upon the manufacturer of carpets who had to 
lFau1kner, H. U. American Economic History. 579. 1924. 
2Taussig, F. W. Tariff History of the United States. 259. 
1914. 
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raise his prices because he was dependent entirely upon 
that class of poor imported wool upon which the tariff bore 
so heavily. Further changes in the classifications resulte~ 
in raising the duties upon higher grade woolens to 44F per 
1 pound and 50% ad valorum. Since most woolens belonged to 
this class it is evident that the effective raise in rates 
was considerable. On the imported types of cotton goodS 
duties were raised. On steel the duties remained substan-
tially the same as they had been but the protection was 
more effective since the centers of steel production were 
now on the great lakes and there were few sections to whicD 
they were not able by reason of their proximity to ship 
steel more cheaply than it could be imported. 
The McKinley tariff contained another interesting 
feature, its reciprocity provision. It provided that cer-
tain duties on coffee, sugar, tea, hides were to be left at 
a low level as long as countries exporting them to the 
United states made no discriminations against American 
agricultural products and manufactures but were to be im-
mediately raised by Presidential ordinance if such dis-
crimination came about.2 The effect of such a clause is to 
render a tremendous advantage to the country so treated, 
especially if, as is usually the case that country only 
ITaussig, F. W. Tariff History £! the United states. 260. 
2Taussig, 
Chap VI. 
F. W. E!!! Trade, the Tariff ~ Reciprocity. 
1927. 
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produces a part of the supply of the particular commodity 
since the price of the commodity will be raised to a level 
above the tariff for those articles enjoying reciprocal 
privileges will be at the same level. The effect of this 
is to enrich the nation receiving reciprocal benefits by 
the extent of the remitted tariffs. 
The McKinley tariff raised duties so sharply that 
the rate affected retail prices immediately and the result 
was that in the mid-term Congressional election the Repub-
licans suffered a crushing defeat. The chief reason for 
this defeat seems to be that the policy of high tariff had 
increased the cost of living considerably creating an ex-
tremely unfavorable reaction. 
While there was no immediate action on this iSSUE 
since the Senate was still preponderantly Republican the 
Democrats kept the issue before the people just as they 
are doing now (1932) by originating House bills involving 
the various issues in the McKinley law. In 1892 the people 
again repudiated the Republican party the whole campaign 
being based upon the tariff issue. It:do not know of any 
election in which the issue was so single, so clearly de-
fined, and upon which the opinions of the parties were so 
accurately set forth and so universally recognized. It is 
not unfair in the light of these facts to say that the vote 
for Cleveland may be interpreted as an enthusiastic endor-
sement of the lower tariff program. 
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The efforts of the Democrats to formulate a 
satisfactory tariff program began immediately but the 
state of the country was not such as would keep the loyalt: 
of the electorate. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act had 
begun to deplete the gold supply. The government was shor 1 
of revenues because the McKinley act had not proved as re-
munerative as had been expected. The outflow of gold in 
silver purchasing and the small store in the treasury at 
the time of Cleveland's inauguration was a cause of severe 
depression. A period of instability ensued during which 
business failures were prevalent and the financial polleie. 
of the government were under fire. After considerable 
effort the Sherman Act was repealed and silver puxchases 
stopped. Cleveland himself had taken heroic measures to 
keep the country on a gold basis. Bonds had been sold for 
gold and by one expedient and another gold was kept in the 
treasury and the confidence of the people was restored. 
In carrylng into effect the tariff policies upon 
which the administration had come into power the Wilson 
Bill was originated in the House, directly after it con-
vened in 1893. The general principles embodied in it were 
simple-. Manufactures were to be stimulated by removal of 
duties from raw materials. Then the higher tariffs upon 
finished manufactures were to be lowered thus giving a con-
siderable degree of protection at the same time that dutie. 
were lowered. The revenues were to be augmented by excis. 
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taxes upon tobacco and some other luxuxies. The free list 
was enlarged to include sugar, wool, iron ore, and lumber. 
It will be noted that protection was to be denied some of 
the strongest trusts. 
In spite of the large Democratic majority in the 
House the Senate majority, because of the relatively slow 
response of the Senate to changes in political allegiances 
was not large. For this reason it was expected that some 
difficulty would be encountered there. When the bill 
reached the Senate it was amended with some six hundred 
and thirty-four amendments which were designed to complete~y 
submerge the original principles of the bill. Sugar was 
again subject to duty but wool was admitted free. The 
general law as ginally passed resulted in lowering the 
level of tariffs to 40% ad valorum but the bill was so 
unsatisfactory to President Cleveland and fell so far shor~ 
of t.he real object in substantially lowering the rates tha~ 
he refused to sign the measure. It became a law without 
his signature in August 1894. 
Since wool and woolens has played so important 
a part in tariff discussion the change to free wool which 
is an important part of this tariff would seem to warrant 
considerable discussion. However the duty was only remit-
ted for three years, 1894-97, and very little can be said 
of the effects of this remission. The effect upon manu-
facturers was to change their raw material source from hom~ 
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to abroad so that imports of wool reached their maximum in 
1897 just as a considerable slump is to be noticed in home 
production. 
The Democratic proposals to admit iron ore and 
coal free were disposed of in the Conferenoe Committee 
both iron and coal being dutied at 40¢ per ton. Almost 
all types of iron were lowered in duty. The duties upon 
cottons and silks were not changed materially. From the 
bounty on raw sugar as contained in the McKinley act the 
Wilson act returned to an ad valorum duty of 40% and a 
specific duty on refined sugar of 1/8¢ per pound. 
It is readily perceived that in almost every 
particular this law failed to carry out the principles whic~ 
the Cleveland successes were based upon. Raw materials 
were still taxed sufficiently to keep most foreign produce 
from competition and the tariffs were in most cases not mat~ 
erially lowered. 
The presidential campaign of 1896, by far the 
most spectacular campaign in American history still found 
the issue of protection before the people. This time, 
however, there were other issues, chief among them the 
"free silverTT issue which was the predominant question upon 
which William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan waged 
their colorful battle. l 
IAn interesting description of the "silver crusade" is to 
be found in Schlessinger, A. M. "A Political and Social 
History of the United states, 1829=1925. 339-4no; 1925. 
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It is impossible to separate the interests which 
were working for increased tariffs from those who were 
crusading against free silver since both causes were linkec 
together in a single campaign by a Single party. However 
the Republican party was able to marshall a support of fOUl 
million dollars behind the two issues. In all liklehood 
the chief part of it was raised on the silver issue. Well 
financed as the Republicans were and pressing the anti-freE 
silver issue as they did it would have been unusual had 
they not received election. In addition to that the country 
had just witnessed a dark period of depression under Cleve-
land. Such phenomena are likely to be miSinterpreted by 
the electorate to the extent that a president in office 
is usually blamed for the events happening during his temm 
in spite of his strenuous efforts to undo the ill work of 
his predecessor which has culminated in these events. 
The election of 1896 swept McKinley into office 
by a large majority. AS interpreted by the Republicans 
this approval which they had gained at the polls amounted 
to a clear endorsement of the protective tariff system and 
of the gold standard principle. In accordance with this 
endorsement of the protective policy the Dingley Tariff 
act was passed in 1897 raising the duties to 57% ad valorum 
average level, 17% above the previous level and about 9% 
higher than the McKinley tariff which had been so soundly 
defeated at the polls in 1890. This extraordinary change 
in opinion cannot easily be explained unless the vote be 
considered to be largely upon the silver issue although 
it is not improbable that the deplorable state of affairs 
under the Cleveland administration were blamed upon the 
tariff of 1894. At least this is to be noted about the 
financial policies of Cleveland and those of Bryan, both 
Democrats of the same period. Bryan was a free silver ad-
vocate, other matters were only incidental to his campaign 
while Cleveland was opposed to any such measures as Bryan 
proposed. His own experiences with the Sherman Silver 
Purchasing Act had been so unfortunate that they persuaded 
him against the further introduction of silver into the 
monetary system. 
Returning to the history of the Dingley Act we 
find that it returned to the duties of 1890 on wool with 
the exception of carpet wool upon which the duty was raiael 
even higher. With the return of duties upon raw wool came 
the old system of compound duties upon woolens, compounded 
of a specific duty to equalize the disadvantage imposed by 
the tariff on raw wool and an ad-valorum tax to protect, 
as was supposed, from the advantages enjoyed by the foreigl 
manufacturer by reason of his cheap labor and priority of 
establishment. 
Silks were taxed by specific duties in classes 
according to the percentage of pure silk content. Duties 
ranged from 50¢ per pound upon goods containing up to 20% 
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silk to $1.3 per pound on high grade silks up to 45%. 
No change was made in the duties on iron ore or 
coal since tl-lese duties, as has been already pointed out, 
were already prohibitive. Taussigl says that imports of 
iron and steel had almost entirely ceased at this time and 
thence no change was necessary to keep out imported iron 
or steel. One or two other factors of this law are worthy 
of mention. The reciprocity clause of 1890 was returned 
to tte act with some modification and the President was 
empowered to negotiate commercial treaties for lowering 
any articles 20% for reciprocal privileges granted by 
another nation. 
The period following the passage of the Dingley 
tariff was marked by unusual prosperity. No one, I think 
would attempt to credit this tariff with creating the pros· 
perity. It may be reasonably assumed that the triumph of 
the gold standard in the election of 1896 coupled with the 
repeal of the Silver Purchasing act resulted in restoring 
the besis of cl~edi t and tel:'.<led to tiring back the confidenc ~ 
of the people. At any rate the period is marked by con-
siderable increases in both exports and imports. This in-
crease in foreign trade since it would tend to be hindered 
by a tariff cannot be regarded as the result of the Dingle~ 
act but rather as the CUlmination of restored confidence 
and expansion after depression whicl: it is to be observed 
is generally independent of tariff legislation. 
Due to the fact that the state of the country 
was prosperous, and also to the fact that the call for 
additional revenue was not loud nor insistent there was 
no additional legislation worthy of note until the general 
revision of 1909. The force of protective duties as high 
as those in the Dingley act was bound to be felt sooner 
or later in increased cost of living. When Taft made his 
campaign in 1908 one of the more important planks in the 
platform called for revision of the tariff to impose "such 
duties as will equal the difference between the cost of 
production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable 
profit to American industries." 
It is to be noted that the so-called -true 
principle" of protection is not vitally different from 
the notion underlying the previous tariffs especially 
those on woolens in which equalizing tariffs were augmentel 
by additional tariffs for protection. However this prin-
ciple goes farther in that it is not of its nature limited 
to fields in which the country is capable of producing ad-
vantageously. The one valid argument for tariffs, that of 
fostering industries which are likely to grow to need no 
protection is entirely abandoned. The new idea being to 
continue protection which will insure a fair measure of 
return to the American business and will continue to in-
sure it at no matter what cost. 
In the preSidential campaign of 1908 the Repub-
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lican party led by Taft assumed that the application of 
the principle just outlined would bring about a downward 
revision since the period which we are now investigating 
was marked by revulsion against the exorbitant profits of 
the large trusts. In other words American business had 
been given too great advantage some of which it was the 
purpose of the Republicans if elected to remove. 
However, the high purposes of election time and 
the vote of the people counted for little in the final 
act. We have already seen that the forces which bring 
about tariff changes have ceased to be the needs of the 
country but have almost entirely come to be the desires 
of vested industries. 
Before proceeding to the examination of the act 
itself it would be well to note some of the methods pur-
sued by these vested interests under the new "scientific 
tariff principle." It is first necessary, however, to 
note a few of the implications of the principles in regard 
to its mechanics. If the tariff is to be made upon the 
prinCiple of equalizing the discrepancies between costs 
of production in the United states and abroad it is first 
important that there be available materials from which 
these data may be obtained. There were over 2.000 dutiable 
articles in the tariff of 1909. These articles are pro-
duced under varying conditions in different countries. 
To truly follow the prinCiple these items would necessarily 
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be investigated bearing in mind the rent on land, the 
costs of materials and labor. At best such an investiga-
tion would entail considerable labor and ingenuity in 
gathering and interpreting these data. When it is remembe ed 
that the cost of transportation is also a vital factor in 
the cost of goods delivered at our harbors it is evident 
n 
that the "scientific principle faced considerable difficul 
ties. 
The real gathering of the data was done through 
investigations in the committees in which the American 
ManU£acturer took great advantage of his right to be heard 
Mr. Taussig generalizes this aspect ftThe details of legis-
lation had been virtually arranged by persons having a 
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome and having also 
the closest relations with the legislators controlling the 
outcome."l 
It would perhaps be unjust to the legislators 
as well as the manufacturers to say that the factors con-
trolling cost of production in foreign countries as com-
pared to our own were deliberately misrepresented, but it 
is not unjust to say that in some cases they were very in-
accurate. In the case of Germany the German Government 
made a rather careful examination of industrial conditions 
ITaussig. F. W. ~ Tariff History £! the United states. 
394. 1914. 
2Senate Documents 61st SeSSion, Part 1. 1909. 
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and found in almost every case the costs of manufactuxe 
in Germany had been considerably underestimated in the 
Congressional hearings. 
While this does not assert the invalidity of the 
discoveries as regard other countries it casts serious 
doubts upon their validity especially when it is observed 
that the errors made were of such a nature as to redound 
to the benefit of the American manufacturer in almost everJ 
case. We find that the tariff as finally passed did not 
constitute a material removal from the trend which had bee~ 
maintained in the Dingley Tariff. The change in the aver-
age scale of duties was about 1% upward according to Sch-
1essinger.l 
President Taft in his speech at Winona, Minne8ot8~ 
2 September 17, 1909. notes ~that under the Dingley law ther~ 
were 2024 items ••••• The Payne Law leaves 1150 of these 
items unchanged. There are decreases in 654 of these items 
and increases in 220 of the items." 
Hides were made free while iron was reduced from 
40¢ to l5¢ and coal from 67¢ to 45¢ per ton while the duty 
on lumber was finally lowered from $2.00 (per thousand feet 
lschlessinger, A. M. A Political and Social History £! the 
United states, 1829-1925. 458. I926. -
2story of a Tariff. (Parts of Conge Record) I have no 
idea wEin or where this compendium of speeches favorable 
to the Tariff of 1909 was printed nor by whom it was com-
piled. It is library number 337/ST. 
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to $1.25. Severe reduet~QBS were made in iron and steel 
but as has been remarked in regard to the act of 1897 no 
duties were necessary since these products were being made 
as cheaply as they could be obtained from abroad. Certain 
types of mercerized cottons were advanced in duty as well 
as silks. There was virtually no change on woolens or 
sugar • 
The reCiprocity clause was retained in the form 
of a provision for minimum and maximum rates·. Against 
countries which discriminated against American goods it 
was possible for the president to raise duties 25% on a 
retaliatory principle. This was never resorted to after 
1910. While the tariff did not seriously affect the growt 
of trade during the time it was in effect (The import 
and export trade had been growing and continued to grow) 
there was general dissatisfaction with the bill. Schedule 
II which referred to wool and manufactures of wool. This 
schedule remained as it had been in the Dingley tariff 
much to the chagrin of the manufacturers of woolens. It 
has been fr.equently pointed out that the duties on raw 
materials are not likely to raise the prices by the extent 
of the duties. This proved true in the ~ool industry. Mr. 
wright l estimates the. price as falling usually about 10% 
below the upper limit of the protection. Thus the wool 
1Wright, C •. W. Wool Growing and the Tariff. (Harvard 
Economic Studies-vT 287. 1~.---
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grower did not receive as much protection as the compositicn 
of the act would lead us to believe. But manufacturers of 
woolens who found themselves faced with the necessity of 
paying extra prices for their raw ,materials on account of 
the duties were the loudest in their protests. 
In spite of MX. Taft's efforts to show that this 
tariff really carried out the ideas of the people upon 
the support of which he obtained his election, there was 
from the begiIUling and continued to be considerable dis-
satisfaction with the law. 
In criticising this particular act there can be 
little discussion of principles gov~rning its action or 
purposes of enactment. Behind most of the changes there 
vould have been nothing but sectionalism as a motive for 
enactment and it is quite impossible to determind any 
measureable changes resulting from its enactment. The act 
as a whole did not differ greatly from its predecessor and 
certainly does not deserve to be called a consequential 
revision. As far as can be determined it had its inception 
in an effort to fulfil the campaign promises of President 
Taft, but it was so revised and completely changed before 
it was finally enacted that it may truthfully be said that 
it conformed at few points with anyone's idea of a tariff. 
As has been pointed out there is more liklihood 
that tariff policies as well as other policies of a govern-
~ent will be subjected to criticism in times of stress than 
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in "normal" times. (We usually refer to periods of inflat~on 
as normal times)· The administration of Taft had been the 
period of deflation. The era of great prosperity came 
8udden1y to an end in 1907 and the party claims of the 
Republicans that they were the party of prosperity came 
down in dust. This factor weakened Taft's position and 
when in 1910 the Congress was filled with Democrats his 
opportunities for success were gone. Added to this the 
Republicans were acutely aware of the conservatism of Taft 
as contrasted with the agressive liberalism of his pre-
decessor Roosevelt. Vlhen election time came in 1912 the 
party was badly split and their defeat was a foregone 
conclusion. 
However. in explaining the election of ~~esident 
Wilson it i8 not enough to say that he was elected because 
his opposition was divided. He was himself a magnetic 
character about whose career there hung an aura of politic! 1 
courage and leadership which brought considerable support 
to his banner. He was a keen observer of political affairE 
and a writer of great distinction in the field of political 
science. Not least of his qualifications for office was a 
broad interpretation of the position of the President. He 
regarded it as a position of considerable power and with 
power to be expanded by leadership. In accord with these 
ideas he called a special session of Congress on April 7, 
1913 to begin the revision of the tariff. 
SECTION SEVEN 
TARIFF OF 1912 
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Congress was predominently Democratic. The 
Republican majority which had passed the Tariff of 1909 
had been transposed into first a Democratic lower house 
then the election in 1912 brought an increase of the Dem-
ocratic majority in the House and also gave them a majorit 
in the Senate. 
Representative Underwood had been shaping a tar-
iff bill for presentation even before Congress convened. 
This bill when presented gained the support of the adminis 
tration and passed the House without amendment. The ever-
present lobby was given sound discouragement by denouncia-
tion by the President and the appointment of a Senate Com-
mittee to bring its activities to light. 
Without any considerable changes the bill passed 
and received the President's signature. It was the first 
Major reduction in-Tariff rates since 1890. Although it 
is rather difficult to estimate the amount that duties hav 
been lowered in this tariff Paxsonl estimates they were 
lowered from 37% to 27%. 
Changes made in this act were numerous and some 
of them were really consequential. For instance wool was 
once more put on the free list. Raw wool being permitted 
to enter free of duty there was no longer any excuse for 
a compensating duty on woolens so the specific duties were 
1 Paxson, F. L. Recent History of the United states. 407. 
1926. 
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eliminated and only a duty of 35% ad valorum was retained. 
On cotton the duty on lower grades was 5% and considerable 
reductions were made in the better qualities. The duties 
ran as high as 27t% ad valorum on cotton cloth "containing 
yarns the average number of which exceeds No. 99.,,1 
Reductions were made in the iron schedules and 
Bessemer steel ingots, iron in slabs and blooms as well as 
steel rails were pui on the free list. This item remains 
rather unimportant because of the relatively independent 
position of the iron and steel industry in this country. 
Some general information about this tariff has been found 
in "A Dictionary of Tariff Information,,2 The information 
deals only with the first eight months that the law was in 
effect since during those months there was no abnormality 
in trade due to conditions of war. On dutiable goods the 
average ad valorum rate was 36% or 4% less than in 1912. 
The rate of duty as related to all imports, free and dut-
iable was 14% or 3% less than in 1912. 
The general reduction of duties in relation to 
all imports is impressive particularly since there was not 
so great value of imports as there had been in the previou 
IComparison of Tariff Acts gf 1909, 1913, and 1922. Pre-
pared for use of Ways and ~eans Committee House of Rep • 
. 71-72. 1923. 
2 
A Dictionary of Tariff Inform!tion. United states Tariff 
Commission. Tariff Act of 1913. 756-757. 1924. 
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year. As a part of this act sugar was made free of duty 
after 1916, the years preceeding to be used for the orien-
tation of the industry to the proposed change. 
Despite the rather small ultimate effect of the 
new tariff law it was a real victory for the proponents 
of lower tariffs. Of course, it did not bring about any-
thing like free trade but it pared off a great deal of the 
upper surplus of prohibitive tariffs ruld carried still 
further then any tariff up to that time the principle of 
free raw materials. There cannot be said to be any part-
icular principle upon which this tariff may be wholly ex-
plained. Even the statemeIlt of Woodrow Wilsonl while it 
deals with several ideas may not be said to limit the matte~ 
to a single principle. He said t "Aside from duties upon 
articles which we do not and probably cannot produce •••• 
and the duties upon luxuries, and merely for the sake of 
revenues which they yield, the object of tariff duties 
henceforth laid must be effective competition, the whetting 
of American wits by contact with the wits of the rest of 
the world." 
This statement of principle does not greatly 
differ from the ideas of the Republican party in giving the 
American manufacturer an even break plus a decent profit. 
In the act which resulted from this policy, however, we fin~ 
lSelected Addresses and ~ublic ~apers of Woodrow Wilson 
New York. 7-8. Dictionarr of Tariff Information U. S. 
Tariff Commission. 845. 924. ' 
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a real reduction of the tariff the effects of which it is 
unlikely will ever be determined since strictures of com-
merce due to war make comparisons impossible. 
Under stress of unusual commercial relationships 
due to war there was organized in 1916 the United states 
Tariff Commission. This body was created for the purpose 
of collaborating with the president and the Ways and Means 
Committees of both the House and the Senate in furnishing 
tariff information and recommending action. ~he first com 
mission had at its head the outstanding ta~iff student of 
the United States, F. W. Taussig of Harvard University. 
The Underwood Tariff remained in effect until 
1922 with the exception of certain clauses which were in-
validated by the Fordney Emergency Tariff of 1921. This 
emergency bill, aimed at the dumping activities of foreign 
countries after the war, placed new duties on almost all 
agricultural products in an effort to keep the prices up. 
It was according to the investigations of the Tariff Com-
mission
l 
successful in holding the prices on certain tJ~es 
of wheat raised in the Northwestern part of the United sta es 
flaxseed prices were kept up, prices of beef did not fall 
so much in this country as in Canada, London, or Buenos 
Aires, wool prices were kept at a higher level than might 
have been expected. Prices were stabilized above the worl 
1Diction~ of Tariff Information. United states Tariff 
Commission. 22. 1924. 
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market in sugar and butter. While these price comparisons 
do not in all cases take into consideration transportation 
barriers and importer's profit they do serve to indicate 
at least a temporary benefit to agriculture from tariffs. 
However the other commodities included in the act were not 
affected by it in any degree. Rice and corn were not rais~d 
in price. This study quotes domestic price on whest in 
Minnesota and lists it as having an exportable surplus. 
The benefit derived from such a tariff could only be tem-
porary since labor and production costs tend to increase 
in a tariff protected industry making it exceedingly dif-
ficult to meet competition in export trade with produc-
tion from tariff free regions. 
When we study the tariff act of 1922 we can in-
terest ourselves in three phases of the situation. We 
wonder what sort of feeling or spirit the law arose from; 
we wonder what forces brought it into being; and we wonder 
what sort of law it is considered upon a purely economic 
basis. 
When we reoall the United states after the war 
we think of new spirits and institutions engendered by the 
war. First, of course, of the intense nati0nalism which 
had been so laboriously and stoutly built up by every in-
strument possible. The churches had hurled from their 
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pulpits praise of America. The newspapers played up the 
courage and strength of the eagle. Every fanciful idea, 
every heroic story, every visible symbol, every mechanism 
of comparison and si~ilitude was invoked to incite into 
the American people a supreme confidence in these United 
states. The people had come not only to believe that the 
United states won the war, but that she won it apart from 
other nations. The part played by this country was viewed 
in the largest light possible and the praise of Europe in-
cidental to the conduct of the war erose in the minds of 
the American people largely from the fact that certain of 
them had been our allies in the struggle. They had in our 
opinion helped us to win a war. 
Peculiarly the entire affair was so surrounded 
with the aura of unselfishness that it was made to appear 
as if this entry into the war had been not by natur"e of OUl 
position among nations but rather by virtue of our aloof-
ness we were able to solve a world problem. Out of our 
contacts with Europe there came not a spirit of co-operaticn 
but a spirit of determining upon keeping America from en. 
tanglement with the perplexing situations with which Eur-
ope had been and still is faced. Following the war in this 
spirit the country returned unsigned the Versailles Treaty. 
They have since rejected severally the parts of it concern-
ing the League of Nations and the World Court. These facts 
are illustrative of the fact that while the United states 
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were in the war they regarded it as a particular case and 
not as a general policy. There was considerable discus-
sion of Washington's Farewell Address after the War. Some 
talk in Congress of our position among the nations, but 
when the whole thing was considered there remained just 
the same desire for economic independence which has always 
characterized the after-war attitude of the American Peop14 • 
The whole theme of national self-sufficiency in 
time of war has been played again and again by economists 
and politicians. After war is a good time to play such a 
theme. The temporary commercial allignments lue to the 
existent state of war are in the process of breaking up. 
The weakened credit of foreign nations is likely to cause 
considerable uncertainty as to the ultimate value of for-
eign trade. Further inflation due to financing the state 
in war causes domestic trade to be greater than usual thus 
enhancing its desirability and leading to the conclusion 
that prosperity may best be gained by domestic rather than 
foreign trade. 
Industries rising out of the exigencies of war 
clamour for their pratection and the whole economic outlay 
is ripe for such nationalistic legislation as may be ex-
pected to arise out of such a situation. 
To examine more closely the entire situation we 
must enquire into the dis~ilusionment occasioned by our 
war in Europe. Prior to the outbreak of the war there had 
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been unusual progress in conciliation, arbitration, oourt 
settlement and-mediation of international disagreements. 
The Hague Tribunal had held conferences in 1899 and 1907 
both of which were highly successful as viewed from this 
distance. still later Norman Angell published a book in 
which it was pointed out that there was nothing to be 
gained by either party to a war. Confidence of universal 
well being and the sense that there was likely to be a 
prolonged period of harl,Ilony among the nations came to be 
a widespread and accepted- notion. The war breaking, as 
it did to most Americens, out of an apparently serene and 
cloudless sky put an end to all such notions. It taught 
the United states that there is no status quo the 8xistenc4 
of which could be expected to continue from one moment to 
the next, but rather that there are forces, or groups of 
forces at work which make war and peace unpredictable. 
The importance of such a nationalistic attitude cannot be 
measured it is a spirit or a condition rather than a dem-
onstrable fact, but certainly it was and is a factor in 
shaping the general tariff policy of the nation. 
The political parties as they were a21igned in 
1916 and again in 1920 played an important part in bring-
ing about the type of legislation which was enacted. Line. 
had been drawn between them on various subjects. People 
were weary of the inflexible idealism of Wilson. They had 
been harangued about the League, the Court, the Fourteen 
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points until they were befuddled and until real economio 
issues failed to touch their judiciousness. It cannot be 
said then than the tariff policy was examined material17 
in the election of 1920. The defeat of the Democrats may 
be explained entirely upon other grounds, chiefly upon the 
attitudes arising out of party conflicts over the League 
and the Court. So bitter were the Republicans in this 
matter that they had covenanted together in the Senate to 
defeat the Versailles Treaty.l 
The tariff was a negligible factor in this cam-
paign except as the election of a Republican government 
meant selection of high protection as the general trade 
policy. The Democrats did not more than reiterate that 
2 
they stood for a tariff for revenue only. Chief issues 
as they appear to have been given their importance were, 
entrance into the League of Nations, Democratic record in 
conduct of war, financial record, tax revision, eeonom7 
in government, merchant marine, and treatment of disabled 
soldiers. 
In a rather leisurely manner the Congr.a. began 
to shape the new bill which was designed to replace the 
Underwood tariff as it had been augmented by the Emergency 
tariff. The factor of political allignment as it dictated 
a relatively high tariff has already been discussed as weI 
1 
Woodburn, J.A. Political Parties and Party Problems in 
the United states. 210. 1924. ---
2N;tional Democratic Committee Democratic Platform. Je.'20 
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as the growth of nationalism as it affects policies. In 
this regard it has been classed with the various peace 
proposals since it involves as they do the problem of 
nationalism versus internationalism. 
As a force in creating tariff legislation in 
this country what is the importance of industrial interes(-~ 
There are two viewpoints in this matter. The first has 
been expressed by Mills. Cobden, Adam Smith. and many 
modern economists. Purely from the standpoint of 8trength.~ 
ening the nation in preparation for periods of stress in 
war or in time of commercial readjustment due to disturb-
ances to which the nation is not a party may be carried on 
by fostering industries essential to the comfort of the 
people. I believe that properly treated this argument re-
fers to judioial selection of key industries to be fos-
tered despite economic advantage in time of war and during 
periods of peace. It cannot refer to mushroom industries 
the growth of which is incident to the conducting of war. 
but which beyond the recognition of a market which the~ 
can supply are not directly or indirectly encouraged by 
the state to begin operations. In this sense the indus-
tries are clearly subservient to the state as truly as if 
they had been subsidized from state funds. 
Distinct from this viewpoint is that the state 
exists to foster industry in any and every conceivable 
fashion. This 1st ter attitude is not the product prime.ril:" 
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of economists but rather has arisen from the ranks of 
purely political discussion. It is interesting to note 
that the system of government instituted by our forefatherl 
has undergone a complete and not too 8ubtile change. The 
system of representation by areas and groups of population 
remains as a system of election but scarcely as an influ-
ence in legislation. Like the German Industria-Stadt the 
American Congress has come to be representative of indus-
trial and commercial interests. True, the members repre-
sent the local interests but largely the more successful 
and more highly organized ones.l In this sense our own 
r·epresentative system is largely virtual rather than sec-
tional. 
Just how objectionable this sort of perversion 
is cannot be directly ascertained. It has many points in 
its favor. First it is certainly true that the individuals 
represented in the various industries and dependent upon 
them for their very lives should be permitted to use every 
~aterial for this discussion has been gathered from: 
lAmerican LetiSlatures and Lefislation Methods. Chap. 
VIII. 228- 74. The pervers on of legislative action. 
2 
LObbYi~ in Congress. Ref. Shelf, Vol VII. No 3. 
Helen • llii11er. .1931. 
3Edward B. Logan. "Lobbying'! Annals of the American. 
Aoadem~ of Political and Social Science:--Supplement. 
Juiy 1 29. -
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influence to derive from the government every legitimate 
aid to the prosecution of a profitable and successful bus-
iness. It is also true that the specialized information 
concerning industrial oosts and markets is not available 
from any souroe exoept the industries themselves. The 
lobby then must be regarded as a oheck upon blundering 
legislation promoted in sheer ignorance of real conditions 
If this were the true condition then the conclusion would 
of necessity be that the lobby is indispensable and of 
great value to legislative bodies. However, the action 
of lobbies has not always been so very iZUlocent. This 
paper has already referred to the rebuttal of the German 
Government to the alleged costs of production at home and 
abroad as represented by industries in this country. We 
have referred to the work of President Wilson in warning 
the lobby to procede with caution in 1912-13. The great 
discussion about the lobby is simplified when it is noted 
that the profit motive enters into every lobby established 
The real problem is sharply drawn: if a lobby is main-
tained to assure intelligent, unbiased legislation it is 
well, but if it is maintained to assure intelligent legis-
lation favorable to the interests maintaining the lobby 
then its usefulness is questionable and its effect upon 
the nation must ultimately be regarded as ill. 
The scope of lobbyist activities is little known 
and less understood. It is not unusual to find people 
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indignant over what seems to them to be undue perversion 
of legislation by lobbyists in one specific regard. The 
truth is that there are lobbies trying to influence every 
bit of important legislation. No subject lends itself so 
well to the activities of the lobby as the tariff. If 
the schedules can be drawn in such a manner as to insure 
profits to certain industries it is certainly to. the best 
interests of affected industries to make every effort to 
influence and shape legislation favorable to themselves. 
In the introductory speech of Senator McKellar 
regarding a bill for controlling lobbying he pOints out 
that during the discussion of the Fordney-MoCumber act 
the members of the lobbies were almost everywhere. "There 
was scarcely a manufactured article or a raw product that 
did not have a special lobby in Washington,· he asserts, 
and then continues to say that most of the lobbies got 
what they were after. He names Senator Lippett of Rhode 
Island as playing a major part in fixing the rates on 
cotton and Mr. Littauer of New York as fixing the schedule 
on gloves. l 
2 Ruby A. Black quotes Senator Walsh as saying 
that the influences of C. L. Eyauson representing the Con-
necticut Manufacturers' Association were worth $VOtOOO,OOO 
1coUfreSSional Records. Vol 65. Part 6. Page 5798. 
Apr 1 8, 1924. 
2"Nation". 129:486-7. October 30, 1929.· 
to Connecticut industries. Among other interests mentionec 
in this article as contributing to the lobby were the 
United states Fottery Assooiation. Association of Wool 
Manufacturers. National Eleotrical Manufacturers Assoc-
iation, velveteen manufacturers, etc. One lobby ~entioned 
frequently is the United states Beet Sugar Association. 
While too much oredit could easily be. given uto~ 
such chance eVidencJ')he aotion of President Wilson in 
regard to the lobby re ~ese examples serve to give an 
incomplete picture, nevertheless--one from which it can 
be concluded easily that the lobby is a major force in 
creating present day tariffs. Further it may be ooncluded 
that the major part of today's organized lobby is interest4d 
in the tariff only so long as they are in a position to 
profit by its favors. At least one oase to the point is 
the laok of interest in this tariff on the part of the 
iron industry which had before they became exporters been 
among the most insistent seekers after protection bene-
ficial to their own interests. 
In addition to these forces there is another 
which has reoeived bare mention. Various' distriots ex-
pect their representatives to stand for special favors 
for that distriot. In Northern Colorado that interest 
is sugar, in the middle west it i8 wheat, corn, beef, and 
hides. The legislator frequently is foroed to take the 
uncomfortable pOSition of being a low tariff man on every-
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thing except the favorite product or industry of his lo-
cality. 
His opportunity for receiving any favors at all 
for his own constituents depends upon his willingness to 
co-operate in the general program of his party and his 
ability to trade favors for favors received. In this sens. 
he becomes the slave of his constituent's one desire to 
protect a single industry and is involved in the general 
log-rolling processes of legislature. In other words it 
is hard to expect the other fellow to humor the fancy upon 
which you received election if you consistently refuse to 
humor those upon which he gained his seat. 
We may list the forces which entered into the 
creation of the act of 1922 as (1) a spirit of nationalism 
arising out of the recent war, (2) the election of a party 
traditionally bound to the policy of high tariffs, (3) in-
dustrial interests as represented by (a) the elected re-
presentatives, and (b) as represented by paid lobbies. 
The law itself is marked by two very interesting 
factors. The first is that it returns to rates in most 
cases as high and in some cases higher than the rates in 
1909. The other is the evolution of the presidential 
authority which in this act went so far as to permit 50% 
revision of the laws at the discretion of the president 
upon the advice of the Tariff Commission. 
One important change which is to be noted in 
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this act is the imposition of higher duties on sugar. The 
act of 1921 imposed a duty of 1.6 on Cuban sugar while the 
previous duty had been 1.0048 and the new duty was 1.7648 
1 
per pound. It will be noted that this is rather important 
since sugar comprised 10.3% of all imports2 into this coun-
try in 1923, the year after the act went into effect. Dr • 
. wright further notes that the increase in Tariff while it 
was bourne at first by the Cuban refiners since unprece-
dented low prices had followed the break in the sugar price 
in 1920 was transferred to the American consumer shortly 
after 1922 and there remained. Revenues were according to 
the same study increased in proportion to the raise in rate 
and the amount imported was not changed materially. 
The chief revenue raising duties in the act are 
according to Phillip G. wrightS s~gar, raw wool, tobacco, 
laces, and embroideries. 
It will be interesting to note a few of the chief 
imports and their 'rate of duty under the acts. 4 
lwright t Philip Q. Sugar.!!! Relation .!2. !.h! Tariff. 182~ 
1924. 
~Dictionar! of Tariff Information,U. S. Tariff Commission. 
350. 192.. . 
°Wright, Phillip G. 'WThe New Tariff Examined." Review of 
ReViews. 66:500. November ,1922. --
~Compiled from a Dictionary of Tariff Information. United 
states .Tariff Commission. IV24. 
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Silk, raw ;$. 77,058 





• · · • 
condition of sing~ea: : 
by grouping or twist- : : 
1ng two or more yarns : : 
together. : : 
In skeins, cops or : : 
warps. Nos. 1 to 205.' ••••••••••••• :60¢ per 
· • · · 
: :lb. plus 
: :10/100¢' 
: :per no. 
: :per lb. 
· · · • · . • • · . Sugar (cane) 103,617 ••• 1 251,905 
· • • · 
• • 
• • · . . 
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· · · · · · · · 








• • between 50o~d 75°; ; 
tested by polariscope •••••••..••.••••• :Subj. to : 1 24/1 0 
: :duty as : per 1b 
• • 
: :mo1ass8s : 
:or sugar.: . . 
Dextrose testing not : 
above 99.7 per cent and : 
· • · • · • 
dextrose syrup ••••••••••••••••••••••• :1t¢ per : : :lb. 
Coffee · 160,854 · · · 
· · Crude rubber 86,345 
Hides · 104,682 · · · Wool · 39,259 · 
In the gre~se 
· Scoured · ." · · 
. . 
· · · · 
· · 
· · 
· · · 101,455 :3¢ per 
:pound 
· 
101,843 :free · · 107,039 :free 
86,546 · · · · · ;24¢ per 
:lb. 
• • · · 
· ;111 per 
.lb. 
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•••••••••••••••••• ;4¢' per 
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:lb. 
" • 
On the skin ••••••••••••••••••••••••• :3¢ per 
'ver 12¢ 
Washed or unwashed ••••••••••••••••• 
Scoured . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
On skin • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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• " · " 
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Another point upon which this tariff was Bupposee 
to have created differences was in the agricultural produc1s. 
Mr. wright l has compiled the following table of duties which 
lWr1ght. Phillip G. American Review of Reviewa. "The New 
Tariff Examined". 6&:500. Nov. 192!:" 
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the farm bloc was able to write into the new tariff: 
Article Aot of : Emergency: Act of Act of 1922 · Tariff • 1913 1909 · . 
• 4 · . . 
Beef and Veal, Fresh: : : 
or Frozen ;3; per 1~2, per lb; free · ;1t¢ per 1l: 
· · · • • fI Butter and butter 
Substitutes 
· . . . 
:·srj per 1'6; per lb ;2i¢' per ;6¢' per lb 
Cheese and cheese 
Substitutes 
Corn per bushel 
· . 
; 5; per l~ 23% 
: . 
: 15rj ; 15, 
• • · . Cotton having staple: • 
1t in. or more in l~, free ?¢ per 
: . 
Flax seed per bu. : 40si ; 30si 
Lemons 
· . 
; 2¢ per lb~¢ per 
• • · · 
• · 20% : 
· · · free · · · • • 
lb: free 
· · 20¢ · · · 
:6, per lb 
• • 
: l5¢' · · • • 
: free · · · • · • 
1b;it per l~ltrJ per lb 
: (in bulk): · . : . 
; 2t¢ per ~, per gal free " per gal Milk, fresh 
gal : : • .. · · · · Molasses not above : 
52% sugars, not to : : 
be used for extrac- : : 
tioD of Bugar of for: : 
human consumption : l/6t/- per: 24% 
Potatoes per cwt 
Rice per lb. 




· • · 50¢' • 25¢ · • · • · · • 1(, • 2¢ • · · • · • · . • • 
: 2.206 perl.¢ per 
: lb. : 
: 1.'765 perl..6 per 
: lb. : .. 
• 
· • · • · • 
• • 
• • · • 
• · · • · • · · • • .. 






• • · •· • · •· • · • 
• • 
• • .. • 




lb:l.256 pe~.685¢ per 
: lb. • 
:1.005 pe~.348¢ per 
: lb. • • • 
Wool unwashed ; 31¢' per lb15¢' per : free :claes I 
: ll¢ per 
:class II 
: 12, per 
: of cleaned Ib 
: content • 
• 
· • · · 
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In measuring the effect of these duties we note 
that there are certain of them which cannot be effective 
except near the border such as fresh milk, fresh beef and 
butter although advances in transportation facilities have 
somewhat broadened these fields. The wheat duties are saie 
to have been effective.1 Secretary Jardine points out tha~ 
the price of No.1 dark no~th.rn spring wheat averages froD 
16, to 27, per bushel more at Minneapolis than a comparab11 
grade at Winnepeg. The effeotive protection here must nat. 
urally be regarded as somewhat less than this estimate, hOl. 
ever. since the transportation is not figured nor are the 
two grades of wheat precisely alike. It seems that while 
corn is one of the important export products of this countr, 
it has never been imported in any quantity at least up to 
1923 so it is unlikely that this duty was effective. 2 
The tariff on sugar while it served to protect 
the industry has been more important as a revenue measure 
than as protection. Except for the years during an4 dir-
ect17 after the war the United states has never produced 
even one forth of the sugar used in domestic consumption. 
The duty on flaxseed was no doubt effective. This 
lunited states Department of Agriculture. Yearbook. 22-9. 
1926. 
2Quantity and value of principle imports and exports of 
the United states. Dictionary of Tariff In£ormation. 
United states Tariff Commission. 349-50. 1924. 
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country has consistently imported flaxseed although there 
is a small domestic industry. The production in 1922 was 
less than half what it had been in 1909.1 In regard to 
cheese the same 8ource2 notes that the American imports 
of cheese are of fancy foreign varieties not manufactured 
in this country. The tariff would not be of any material 
benefit to the domestic industry in that case. The tariff 
on potatoes can almost be disregarded. The "potatoes from 
the principle producing countries have been barred by 
quarantine since October. 1912."3 and the amount of pota-
toes imported free prior to the war and during the first 
years of the war would only amount to a fraction of 1~ of 
the consumption. The duty on rice is one cent per pound. 
The Amerioan rice industry supplies almost the whole dom-
estic market and exports 400,000,000 pounds of rice annually4 
and it is likely that the duty is effective. This same rale 
of duty was in the 1913 act. The duty on wool was not 
raised above the emergency act since it takes more than two 
pounds of unwashed wool to make a pound of cleaned wool. 
The Nation6 makes no statement regarding the wool productio~ 





DNation. Deo. 23. 1925. Vol 121. 721-2. 
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but the following exerpt is enlightening. "The tex~ile 
industries, with the highest protective duties, are in so 
bad a way that their official spokesman, confessing that 
they pay the lowest wages of any American industry, appeal 
for still higher duties, while the oarded woolen manufact-
urers association makes complaint that the specific duties 
on wools, reaching 191~ ad valorum on the cheaper wools ar 
ruinous to the business. 
If the evidence be admitted then the market for 
raw wools must have been considerably constricted by the 
imposition of such heavy duties on raw wool that the con~ 
sumer refused to purchase the finished product. 
Before summing up the information regarding the 
farmer and the tariff we must remember that the farmer re-
ceives his implements without duty. However this boon 
not appear so great when as Mr. Jardine assertsl the price 
of implements abroad are usually higher than here so that 
it is doubtful if the duty were one imposed could affect 
the prices of farm machinery. The combination of cheap 
iron (duty 75¥ per ton) and American efficiency at machine 
labor cause this farm machinery to be produced more econ-
omically than abroad in spite of the higher cost of labor. 
(Labor cost per unit of labor is naturally higher since 
living is more expensive and labor is not too plentiful; 
however, the cost of labor per uhit of production is not 
lu. ~ Department ~ Agrioulture Yearbook. 1926. 22.29. 
LIBRARY OF THE 
STATE AGn:CULT'L COLLEGE 
FORT COLLINS, COLO. 
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so great in the really efficient industry.) 
From this study of the agricultural schedules it 
is to be seen that the farmer reaps but little benefit fron 
the tariff. Such articles as potatoes, rice, cheese, corn, 
milk can have very little real effect while those on wool 
are shown to constriot the sale of wool ~d those on sugar 
to protect an industry which is spite of protection con-
tinued over many years fails of really being established. 
The wheat schedule has been praised because it kept the 
price of wheat in Minneapolis higher than the price at 
Winnepeg, but it is not unlikely that the transportation 
would destroy at least part of the Canadian advantage. 
Because almost any figures on how much protect101 
costs the farmer as a consumer would be unreliable this 
paper will make no effort to present such statistics, how. 
ever, there is of course a considerable raise in farm coste 
due to protection both on articles which he consumes and 
in the form of wage costa. 
rn this regard however there are those who be-
lieve that the burden of the tariff is becoming more equalJy 
distributed. Jacob H. Viner summarizesl the situation in 
these words: 
"In the main, .American agriculture still undoub;-
edly loses more than it gains by the protective tariff 
l"American Export Trade and the Tariff." Annals of the 
American Academy. Vol 127. 132. 1926. 
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policy. But the burdens of the tariff are rapidly shiftins 
to the more efficient of the manufacturing industries, and 
to the shipping and mining industries. The benefits, such 
as they are, are now being divided in more even portions 
between those manufacturing industries which continue to 
be ill adapted to American productive conditions, and those 
branches of agriculture which both receive protection and 
on their present scale of prOduction cannot fully meet the 
demands of the American market." 
It cannot be too greatly emphasized here that the 
producer who truly competes with the producers of other 
countries for the trade in his product in the world's mar-
kets cannot possibly receive any benefit from a tariff un-
less he sells his goods for more in the domestic market 
than he receives in the foreign market. There is no de-
fense for any duty which would permit such a condition. 
The point to the discussion of the Fordney-Mo-
Cumber tariff as it relates to the farmer is not the stud1 
of an isolated sort of legislation produced to remedy a 
particular situation even though the agricultural rates 
arose out of the rates in the Emergency act (an act de-
signed to prevent dumping. It is highly questionable if 
the low prices of European produce was really dumping). 
These rates were applied later under very nearly normal 
circumstances. The amount which these rates helped the 
farmer is almost negligible as has been shown. It is 
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evident from the data that it is not likely that any tarifj 
would materially benefit the farmer; on the other hand the]e 
can be no doubt that he bears quite a part in the burden o~ 
protection. This paper concludes that the protection is 
inimical to the interests of agriculture. 
As we return to the general discussion of the 
act we find that the general level of duties estimated by 
the relation of duties to all imports is Bomewhat less that 
that in the act of 1909.1 The raises in the tariff were 
in many cases based upon the tariff policy prior to 1913 
and the ~ates themselves show this to be true. ~he author 
of the bill2 presents it ramified with the arguments that 
it will stimulate industry and raise wages. It is hard to 
judge what effect the tariff really did have on industry 
as a whole. We do know that it is during the period be-
ginning even beiore the passage of this tariff and lasting 
up to now that the relation of unhampered world trade to 
debt settlement has been introduced into the tariff di8-
cussion. 
Knowing how the tariff is constructed, very much 
at the behest of the industries who are likely to profit 
lWright, Phillip G. "The New Tariff Examined." 
Reviews. 66:602. Nov. 1922. 
Review of -
2Representative Joseph W. Fordney. "The Oase for Protec-
tion." Current Opinion. 73:649. Nov. 1922. 
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by it. Then it is not certain that their knowledge is 
sU£ficient even to secure the protection o~ their own in-
terests. Knowing the tendency to trade favors under legis-
lation it is not unusual that no one haa ever taken the 
trouble to try to separate the influence of the tariff in 
the various industries, except those partisans who argue 
only one side of the question. Such a task would at the 
outset seem to involve too much data and too many relations 
to be capable of any reliable, definite settlement. That 
any such study would be very interesting is undoubtedl)" 
true, and it is true that carefully kept records of that 
sort would be invaluable as indices to the effect of tar-
i~fs upon domestic manufacturers. However, the nature of 
the tari~f is such that there are involved in it other 
issues of equal importance to the effect on domestic in-
dustry and in a sense quite inseparable from the welfare 
of those industries. We have never up to this point had 
to question the virtue of the tariff on the ground of its 
relation to the trade balance of nations. 
When this country was in debt to other countries 
although the debts certainly took on no such proportions 
as the present debts have the policy of restricting imports 
was sound from the viewpoint of one who Wished to eliminate 
the nation's foreign indebtedness. If we imported but few 
things our expenditures abroad would be lessened and the 
exports from us to the foreign nations would more nearly 
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equal or sometimes be more than our imports and thus the 
balance would be such that the exchange of money would be 
more likely to be from foreign nations to the United statee 
and by permitting the balance to pay upon the debt the 
whole business would approaoh settlement. 
The conduct of the war was more expensive than 
the participating nations ever dreamed that it- would be. 
Their reserves for such an emergency were insignificant 
when applied to the enormous expenditures which proved to 
be necessary. However, some of the neutral countries were 
able by commercing with the belligenents and by trading 1n 
the markets previously held by the belligerents to promote 
a considerable prosperity. The United states was a very 
prosperous nation before and during the war. It was a com-
paratively Simple matter to extend our oredit almost un-
limitedly to these nations and thus to not only help fin-
ance the war but also to make a market for our goods. It 
must be clear that the money that the United states loaned 
to Europe was not coin or paper money but was rather the 
credit to buy foodstuffs and the materials of war. 
Despite the fact that there was and still is a 
blind and foolish optimism about how the various nation. 
can pay their debts to US in spite of the tariff the truth 
is that the presence of the tariff will probably make it 
impossible for the debtors to the United states to pay 
their debts. As has been stated the ignorance regarding 
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the simple facts and principles involved in the debt con-
troversy is little lese than astounding. A case to the 
point is a man who has served •• a clerk on the House Ways 
and Means Committee and who was serving as a tariff expert 
in the Ways and Means Committee of the House at the time 
the Fordney-McCumber Bill was passe'. Edward Nelson Ding-
ler (son of the congre8sman frem lIaine) says: 
'~o. it is aa1d that .e are a ·cre4itor 
nation" and for that rea.on must not raise tariff 
duties, but lower them in order to permit Europ-
ean countries to pa7 us eleven billions due from 
the World War. Some -,atriot.- fear that Europ-
ean debtors may not be able to pay; we must re-
ceive pay in goods. There is just about a8 much 
sense in that theory as there would be in the as-
8Umptlon that the coal merchant .1, from whom B , 
t1 woolen merchant, 'b1I.78 coal, could not be paid 
unless A bought from » woolen goods equal in value 
to the price of the coal .upplled B. In the most 
primative condition of society, whan there waa 
no conception of money of account, banking or 
commerce. such tran.actlons, of cour.8, .. ere nec-
essary. ~hat a motern banker should believe in-
ternational oommeroe in this age must be con-
ducted by such elementary methods, is diffioult 
to understancl." 
Yet even the eleven billions referred to by Mr. 
Dingley could not have been pail in the gold exchange 
standard because there was not that muoh monetary gold. 
The paJ.ment of any part· of .uoh tebte in gold i8 likely 
to seriously end~ .. r the ore4it .tructure of the nation 
indulging in such a practice. 
IDingley. E. N. 
Unemployment". 
Oct. 1922. 
"A Tariff to Raise Revenue and R.duce 
~erioan Review ~ Reviews. 66:393 
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Indeed, speaking from an international viewpoint 
the decreased buying power which caused the world wide de-
pression less than ten y~. laier than the 1922 tariff 
may be explained very tenab17 by the gradual outflow of 
gold from European nations and the consequent weakening of 
their credit systems. 
A curious anolomy 1s presented in the minds of 
many people by the fact that the European nations can and 
do expend considerable sums on preparations for war still 
are not able to pay upon their debts to this country. 
However the credit media which they use in domestic trade 
are not gold and it is gold that the United states regards 
8S money'in payment of international balances. !he re-
duction of pay,ment of debts to the bases of goods or gold 
coupled with the fact that the,re is not enough monetar7 
gold to settle the debts in the w~ world brings us to 
the conclusion that Europe must be permitted to sell goods 
in this country in order to pay her debts. The European 
Debtors unfortunately are situated geographically much as 
this country is. The great staple pro4ucte, sugar, corn, 
wheat are raised in those countries while both Germany and 
England are great producers in the iron and steel indus-
tries. In this sense these countries can produce and do 
produce about the same kinds of merchandise as the United 
states. The European nations have since the war erected 
great tariff barriers which have diversified their indus-
109 
tries just as those in this country are diversified. The 
result is that the efforts toward self-sufficiency in al-
most all nations has resulted in their duplicating the 
work of one another in the various fields of industry. This 
country has a tariff that levies duties on a great variety 
of things and a free list which is made up of two classes 
of things: 1, those whioh are produced more economically 
here than anywhere else in the world, an4 2, those which 
cannot without absurd expenditure be produced in this 
country. The result is that the European debtors cannot 
pay their debts to the United states unless they are able 
to either lower their cost of production until the cost 
plus the tariff is as low as the jmerioan price--in which 
case it is likely the tariff would be raised, or they coula 
lower their costs in the free articles until it was less 
than our own--in which case the articles would in all likli~ 
hood be removed from the free list. In either of these 
cases the result is predioate' upon extremely low stan4ards 
of living and the absolute loss of purchasing power in 
Europe as a market for United states goods. 
It is rather obvious from this treatment that it 
is practically impossible for Europe to pay her debts to 
America as long as the present type of trade legislation 
continues. The effects of the tariff from an international 
viewpoint are more directly discernable than from a purely 
domestio viewpoint and the issues are not quite so complex. 
ll0 
If the tariff does not prevent the exchange of certain gooa. 
it is not proteotive, if it does, it needs conSiderable 
justification in the way of measurable and direct benefits 
to the industry and the nation to offset its disasterous 
effect upon the trade of nations. 
~he increased growth of overlapping industries 
is illustrated by the insistent demand for tariff rat •• 
on certain iron alloys used in warfare which prior to the 
World War had been largely imported 8S provided for in 
paragraphs 304 and 305 of the Aot of 1922 in which dis-
tinction is made between various alloys and high rates im-
posed. Importation of such steels could naturally have 
continued after the war. Suoh a oourse would not only be 
economical, but the conservation of our own limited supplie_ 
of the alloying metals would b. accompli.hed at the same 
time. 
The tariff as it was enacted in 1922 was not 
anything which could not have been fairly accurately pre-
dicted by one who was acquainted with the temper of the 
American nation. The surge of patriotism which had come 
welling up to the surface in the trying period of the war 
was based upon sturdy, self-sufficient nationalism. This 
force expressed itselt in this law by suoh measures as 
the extreme protection of dyes ana steels containing cer-
tain alloys as well as in the general high17 protective 
nature of the whole bill. The local interests of legislatire 
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favors of each section of the nation were not neglected, 
and to insure the industri.. ani trades of their proper 
voice in the matter well organised lobbies were present 
to push forward skillfully and insistently the several 
interests which they represented. ~h. Republican party 
wi th its precedents of high proteot11m waa r.'turned to 
power. These factors serve to explain the bill and viewed 
in these lights it is not diffioult to see that it is as 
it was likely to be. 
International considerations which had seemingly 
been submerged in nationalism were disregarded. This 
country's new status as a or84itor nation was disregarded. 
New interests that had grown up during the war were pre-
served. Aside from changes in the sohedules the act of 
1922 introduced some naw ,rinciples into tariff making. 
For the first time in the history of the making of tariffs 
in the United states some of the clauses were devised by 
experts. In the tut-1l.e schedules there was affected a 
general revision of classifioations, the delet10n of ob~ 
sol.scent paragra»h8. !he entire .ection was simplified 
and brought up to date. 
While the duties themselves were not made in ao-
cordance with those reoommended by the commission the ver7 
work of simplifying the law inasmuch as it renders the a4-
ministration of its clauaes more simple 18 a distinct slr-
v1oe. Another prinoiple .hioh was changed in acoordanoe 
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with the desires of the commission was the method of duty~ 
ing wool. The law bas •• all wool duties on clean wool 
without regard to its original grease content or the plaoe 
or origin. This feature is an improvement from the Btan4~ 
point of its common compreheD81bl1i17. In previous years 
the experts who knew what per cent of wool was consumed 
in shrinkage due to washing or soour$ng could fool the 
1nadept members of the 00~'8'. However the duty1ng in 
aocordance with clean cont.nt is less susceptible to ae-
ce1t and chicanery d.8,1'e the faot that it create. a 
manifestly unequal tax upon different types of wools. The 
better wools seem to have the greatest grease oontent, 
hence they will clean less wool an4 duty les8 under the 
new law than the old. 
In the adm1n1s~ralive prov~s1ons the whole code 
as rewritten by the Tariff Commission was written into the 
law. Not that there were any very far-reaching changes 
made in the nature of the administration 1tself or that 
the rules of assessing customs dut1es underwent any marked 
change but the revision and oodifioation of the guiding 
material so that the matters which had grown irrelevant 
were no longer included to entangle a not toooareful ad-
ministrator. 
The work of the !ariff Oommission has been of 
great value in this regard. ~he tariff acts ha.ve been 80 
oarelessly written 'that administration has been rendered 
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painfully hard. Whereas most oloths have been dutiable by 
thread count and fineness the main part of such provisions 
are now based upon the weight of the goods and the material~ 
The American valuation enters into this law for 
the first time. It may be defined as the value of the ar-
ticle as produced in Amerioa. Manifestly on artioles need-
ing protection an ad valorum duty on American valuation 
~ould yi,ld much greater protection than the same rate of 
duty on the lower foreign price. !he effort to adopt this 
system of valuation was defeated on almost every product 
but it 1s retained under the new dye schedules where the 
~rohibitive duty is 40~ plus ,~ per pound, American valua-
tion. Four other valuations are used. The United states 
~alue which is the value of an imported oommodity in the 
~nited states after duty, .barg •• for transportation and 
not over 8~ for profits or oommi8sions have been deduoted. 
Cost of production may be used a8 a basis for levying dut-
ies when all methods else fail and it i8 possible to apply 
it. 
As usual the ohief bases for determining the duty 
are "The foreign value or the export value, whichever is 
~igher."l 
In section 115 of this law there is provision for 
one of the most far-reaching administrative changes ever 
~Administrative Provi8ions Act of 1922. Section 402 (1) 
from Comparison of Tariff Aots of 1909, 1913, and 1922. 
1923. - --- - --
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made in our government. The clause contains the flexible 
tariff provision. The President is given the power to 
change the tariff on any article either upward or downward 
as much as 50% of its present duty it such a change is re-
commended by the U. S. Tariff Commission. Such a power 
given into the hands of the exeoutive .eems at first to be 
quite a change in the congre8sional system. The power un-
der which the enactment of tariffs is derived 1s found in 
the right of the lower House to originate all legislation 
designed to create revenues. A casual perusal of the his-
tory of any recent tariff with the exception of the Under-
wood act will reveal that the point is 1008817 construed to 
~ean that any part of it may originate there and that sub-
sequent change even of such a nature as to alter theinten-
tion of the act may be made in the Senate. The transferenc. 
of certain of these powers to the President may be regarded 
as no material departure from preoedent in the interpretaticn 
of the Constitution in these matters. 
However, there is in this act the admission that 
the whole problem of tariffs has defeated the ingenUity of 
the Congress. The great per cent of flex seems to permit 
the interpretation that the error of the Congress may be 
rather large. Even the 50% clause itself does not embrace 
the whole scope of the preSident's power. If he sees fit 
~e may by proclamation substitute the American Valuation 
~or the valuation in use continuing the same duty ad valorw~, 
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that is, the duty as stated in terms of foreign valuation 
or export value. Decreases in duty under this proceedure 
must not exceed 50% from the original as fixed by Congress. 
The important phase of this change 1s the great 
importance it attaches to the Tariff Commission. It is to 
be noted that it is this commission, whose powers have up 
to this point been only advisory, which is given the in-
itiative in bringing about such action on the part of the 
President. 
Here too is evidence of a greater effort to apply 
the principle of equalizing costs to the making of a scien-
tific tariff. The fact that a tariff rate departs from 
that principle is the basis upon which the duties are to 
be changed under the flexible provision. 
The principle of equalizing costs has already 
received considerable mention since it was the standard to 
which the Act of 1909 and the Act of 1913 were supposed to 
have been measured. Some time has been spent to show that 
when this theory is carried to its logical conclusion there 
would be no trade between nations since it could never be 
profitable to the exporter. As a theory of trade it is 
easily perceptible that its universal application would 
nullify any benefit which a nation might expeot to derive 
in trading by virtue of possession of natural. advantages 
for special industries. Despite the theories which may be 
employed at election time to beguile the voter into voting 
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for this party or that it i8 not to be expected that the 
declaration of principles will in any large manner effect 
the practices in making tariffs. 
The nation 8S represented by the publications of 
~ts journalists, polio1ana and economists have shown unu-
~ual interest in this law. I have seen fit to include a 
~ew of these oomments here. They are of interest chiefly 
because they foreces. the action of the law during the 
~ajor part of the past 4ecade. 
1 
F. W. Taussig: 
"Then revision of a tariff act like that of 
1922 will be peremptorily 'emanted. The tariff 
question is not settled; it 1. likely to remain 
on the political battl.field for yeara to come •• 
••••• much the wiser oourse if a proteotive system 
must be accepted as a part of the .ettled order 
of things would be to shape it in suoh a form 
that it would endure for a considerable length 
of time; to eliminate the extreme and vulnerable 
features and to make a aerious and honest endeavor 
to establish a regi •• with whiGh the country might 
remain content. Onlytn this way is it p08sible. 
for a period at leaat, really to take the tariff 
out of politics. IThe tariff act of 1922 can serve 
no such purpose." 
Joseph W. Fordn87: (Author of Bill) 
"I am certain that the new tariff law will 
~rove a success. It will raise apprOXimately 
1400,000.000 in revenue annually, will save many 
American industiies and put many idle men and 
women to work." 
Quarterll Journal £!. Econo~ic8. "Tariff of 1922." Nov. 
1922. 1-28.· . 
2Current Opinion. No~. 1922. Vol. 73. 649. 
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Phillip G. Wright: 
"So far as human foresight can penetrate it 
seems likely that the framers of the Tariff Act 
of 1922 will for a time be in a position to con-
tratulate themselves on their wisdom as evidenced 
by results. Nevertheless the act is not one which 
the economist or, I believe, the far-seeing states-
men can regard with enthusiasm. wl 
Abraham Berglund--University of Virginia: 
"In general the act of 1922 must be linked 
with the acts of 1890, 189', and 1909 as among 
the highest so far as rate. are concerned, in 
our tariff history. ~8to its probable benefi-
cent or other effects, opinions will vary accord-
ing to individual leanings with regard to trade 
policy. It is indeed in line with the intense 
nationalism which has beoome so pronounced in 
recent years and in accord with the general 
spirit of our law. sinoe the Civil War. A high 
tariff means, however, a oertain amount of com-
mercial isolation, and the question can be raised, 
"Is this isolation in accord with either our own 
aspirations or the World's .ue.481'· 
In general the eoonomists are still holding 
fast to the free trade dootrine although there are oertain 
exoeptional oircumstance. un4.r whioh protection, if it 
could be properly applied, i8 admitted to be economical17 
sound. Mr. Taussig seems to be hopeful that there will be 
a reaction against the high tariffs of this aot but on the 
whole there seems to be little. hope that affeotive revision 
will be accomplished as long as the present political line~~ -, 
InThe New Tariff Examined." P. G. Wright. American Review 
~ Reviews. 66:499. Nov. 1922. 
2"~he !I!ariff Act of 1922: Abraham Berglund. American 
Economic Review. 13:13.33. 
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obtains. This is not 80 much due to the lack of general 
demand for such effective revision as expressed in various 
periodicals and in the daily press a8 it is due to sectiona~ 
interests interplaying to defeat .eparately each item of 
revision. 
The years following the enactment of the 1922 aot 
were years of great trade activity and prosperity. There 
is some difficulty in determining the real effect of the 
tariff upon industrial growth but an effort will be made 
to trace the courses of some of the industries chiefly con. 
cerned in the tariff discussion. In spite of the seTeral 
studies which have been made of comparative wheat prioe. 
in Winnepeg and Minneapolis during the months of Ootober. 
November, and December, 1922, in an effort to show that 
there Was some positive and direct way in which the tariff 
helped the agrioulture of the United states there perSisted 
during the years in which this act was in force a consider. 
able opposition to that theory. There always haa been 8uoh 
an opposition to agrioultural tariffs supporting itself 
chiefly on the argument that there are two alternatives in 
protection of agriculture, the first is in the case of such 
products as wheat in which the export surplus determines 
the price and the second in cases as sugar or olive oil 
im which the industry is not likely to eTer supply the do-
~estic demand henoe adds in living costs more than it. can 
ever repay. (Repayment would depend upon its becoming 
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advantageously established and eventually lowering the 
prices.) The plight of agrioulture during this whole per-
iod was rather poor. While other industries seemed to r.-
dover from the depression of 1920-21 agriculture did not. 
Throughout the decade 1920-30 there was a stealy and insis-
tent cry for farm relief and the candidates for Presidency 
did not fail to make vote capital out of it. !he platforms 
of the major political parties declared for some sort of 
relief for the farmer in 1924 and 1928 and it is very likel/ 
that the question will be of considerable importance in 
P"932. 
Mr. Gray Silverl lays the misfortunes of agricul-
ture at the door of the tariff. His theory is interesting 
and contains more than a grain of truth. The effort 60 
~romote a one sided trade with Europe after the war oaused 
~heir people to revert to the s01l as 1s the wont of every 
tpeople impoverished in indu.stry because their trade outleta 
~re closed. The resultant growth of economic self-suffic-
ienoy in hllrope destroyed the markets for American agricul-
tural exports and left the farmers faoed by surpluses of 
low priced farm products. 
The general effect of the tariff did not change 
~aterially during the eight years from 1922 to 1930. The 
INational Association of Manufacturers Preceed1ngs 1924. 
131-40. Speech by Gray Silver, Washington Representative 
American Farm Bureau Federation. Cexerpt Ref. Shelf. Vol' 
V. No.4. 1927. Original source not consulted.) 
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tariff on sugar still adequately protects the domestic 
sugar industry much of which still continues to produce 
under disadvantageous conditions and only by virtue of the 
1 
tariff •. Taussig pOints out that the chief benefit of the 
high tariff goes to Hawai~ and Porto Rico rather than to 
the domestic producer since the tariff is designed simply 
to equalize costs of production and the costs of proauct1011 
in these island possessions is considerably lower than in 
the United states. They have the protected market to sell 
upon yet do not really need such a degree of proteotion. 
The iron and steel industries present no marked 
change during this period since in all cases except the 
special alloys in industry mentioned before as arising 
from the conditions of war there has been no need for pro-
tection and protection if extended would b. of no benefit. 
The rayon industry which from its inception has received 
protection has shown such enormous profits as to make it 
seem reasonable that it could exist without any protection 
at all. It is estimated2 that only 10% of the rayon manu-
factured in this country earned a profit of less than 40~ 
per pound and the profits during the war and directly after 
ranged as high as $1.00 per pound. 
The cotton manufacture. acoording to the same 
IF. W. Taussig. Some Aspects ~ !a! Tariff Question. 
Chap. XXII. 193r.-
2Ibid • 43'1. -
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study while it is being transferred to the south is inde-
pendent of protection for the poorer grades of cloth to 
which the machine methods of mass production may be easily 
and profitably applied. The other grades of cloths are 
still manufactured by virtue of protection and show no ap-
preciable orientation to this country. 
The wool growing industryl has for a long while 
been one of those industries in which the comparative ad-
vantage is with some producers and in which other producer 
are producing by virtue of the tariff. The varying costs 
of production cause this industry to be in a measure depen 
dent upon the tariff for continuation. 
The woolens industry retains its status as bafor 
it is dependent upon the tariff and shows little tendency 
toward establishment. 
It is to be noted particularly that there was 
little relative char~e in the various important tariff 
protected industries. In the main they showed little 
growth or change in status. The one great exception to 
this is the rayon industry. A study of the growth of that 
industry, however, is convincing that the various techni-
logical improvements were a greater force in its growth 
than the degree of protection offered. 
1 F. W. Taussig. ~ Aspects of the Tariff Question. 
Chap.XXVI. 1931. - -
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The tariff Commission was organized 8S an advi-
sory body in March, 191"7. The war causing swift changes 
in the commercial set up of the nations brought about a 
distinct need for 80me immediate, ~orrelated material about 
commerce in relation to the tariff. This body set about to 
make a great many investigations in matters pertaining to 
the various schedules, and in 1921 Thomas Walker Page, then 
Chairman of the Commission hal investigated several thou-
sands of items with referenoe to the tariff making aepeets 
of each together with considerable information with refer-
ence to costs of pro4uetion in the United states and abroaa~ 
Of course the Commission at that time had no 
power to make rates or to recommend alterations in the ex-
isting schedules. The material was presented purely as 
data from which no conclusions were drawn and without any 
specific recommendat-ions as to the manner or degree of 
change. 
The material which had been gathered was of littl~ 
permanent value in the making of the act of 1922 due part-
ially to the rapid changes in commerce and industry all 
over the world. Changes which occurred 80 rapidly as to 
render obsolete within a few months any data regarding 
costs of labor and materials. The situation was even 
IThomas Walker Page. Making the Tariff 19 !£! United 
states. Footnote pages 35-36-37. 1924. 
123 
further complioated by the almost daily changes in the ex-
change value of money. Conditions like this were augmented 
by the efforts of the erstwhile belligerents to stabilize 
their currenoy systems upon varying new bases. 
The other faotor which rendered the work of the 
commission in gathering data in comparative costs of little 
value was the small disposition of the Congress to legis-
late upon the groundwork of its findings. In regard to 
that law it has already been noted that the commission en-
tered into its makeup not as a force in fixing consequentie~ 
matters but rather in changing oertain administrative clauses 
and deleting obsolescent materials. 
However, the law of 1922 brought new duties to 
the oommission. It was empowered to recommend rates to 
the President for changes upward or downward within a 
range of 50%. It began to assume new importance in respect 
to ohanging rates but the power thus conferred upon it was 
regarded as temporary and only necessitated by the unstable 
oonditions arising out of post war industrial conditions. l 
According to the general formula upon which the commission 
was supposed to carryon its work, that of equalizing the 
cost of produotion there was the great problem of adjust ina 
to the changes which were occurring about this time. Undel 
Section 315 of the Aot of 1922 the power of changing duties 
1Chamber of Commerce Referendum, No. 37. 6. From Making 
the Tariff in !h! ~ ~ (original source not consUlted) 
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by proclamation was given to the President and the com-
mission. 
The activities of the President and the Tariff 
Commission under Section 315 of the Act of 1922 will re-
ceive considerable treatment here. I do not think that 
any less than a detailed treatment of this activity would 
be warranted since the chief phenomenon in recent tariff 
legislation has been the growth of tariff making power de-
legations to the President and to the Commission. 
The first deoision of which I find any recordl 
is in the report on sugar. The majority report set the 
costs of produotion in Cuba at 1.2302 cents per pound less' 
than domestio costs, while the minority reported a wider 
distance separating costs than was bridged by the duty 
1.7616 cents per pound. The deoision of the President 
(Calvin Coolidge) was to postpone aotion beoause there was 
no positive correlation of results of the oommission, and 
the oonditions under whioh it reaohed its deoision were in 
a state of change. 
I cannot give this deoision the round oondemna-
tion that many writers have given to it. It seems to me 
that'in such industries as the sugar industry in which the 
costs of produotion are so dependent upon the favor of the 
~eather and the varying rents for land the principle of 
INinth Annual Report ~ !£! Tariff Commission. 1925. 
116-118. 
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comparative costs is subject to such constant and pains-
taking adjustment that it is impracticable. 
I 
In this same report the President refuses to 
raise the duty on cotton war,--kDit fabric gloves. The 
recommendation of the oommission was based purely upon the 
variance in cost of production. The decision was evidentlJ 
based upon the small and decreasing production of this 
branch of the cotton industry. It seems to be a very just. 
ifiable refusal since as he pOinted out in his refusal the 
price of gloves would be raised about 50% by compliance 
with the commission's recommendations and the industry 
supplied only a small part of domestio needs. 
In the following year2 the duty on taximeters 
was increased from $3.00 each plus 45% ad valorum on foreign 
value to $3.00 each plus 27.1% of American selling price, 
December 12. During the couxse of the year the duties were 
increased upon men's straw hats, butter, print rollers, ana 
methanol. The duty on paint brush handles was cut in half. 
In 19273 the commission recommended, Commissioner Costigan l 
dissenting. that the duty on iron in pigs be raised. Pro-
clamation was issued to that effect March 25, 1927. The 
lTenth Annual Report of the United states Tariff Commission. 
19. 1926. --
2 Ibid• 118. -
SElev.nth Annual Report of the United states Tariff-Com-
mission. 11. - - -
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duty of $.75 per ton was raised to $1.125. The report of 
1921 notes that effect of this change amounting to an in-
crease ad valorum of about 2% was not determinable in com-
parisons of imports. 
Other increases in duty were on gold leaf, Swiss 
Emn1enthaler cheese and crude magnesite. There is little 
available data regarding this type of cheese. Commissionex 
Costigan filed a dissenting report. The Magnesite industr~ 
came about as an outgrowth of the war. It is used in lin-
ing certain types of iron furnaces. Austria and Czecho-
slovakia were its principle producers until the war, and 
the United states is the chief market. 
Phenol and crssylio acid were subjected to llght.~ 
duties than before. ~l of the various cases which were 
pending regarding the legality of action of the President 
under section 315 were brought to repose by the decision 
of the Supreme Court holding section 315 to be constitu-
tional April 9, 1928. 
Under the flexible provision the duties on cher-
ries, rag rugs, preoipitated barium carbonate, socium 8ili-
coflouride, flourspar, and potassium permanganate were in-
creased in 1928.1 There was no decrease in duties by 
Presidential Proclamation during the years 1928 and 1929. 
In the latter year onions, cast polished plate glass, 
1 Twelfth Annual Reiort of the United States Tariff Com-
mission. 17. 19 8. -- --- . 
12'7 
peanuts, preserved eggs, flaxseed, fresh milk, cream, 
cylinder, crown and sheet glass, and linsee'd oil were the 
recipients of increased duties. 
A survey of these changes reveals only five de-
creased and 32 increased in duty. Two notations may be 
made from this. First the sentiment of the body seemed 
to be distinotly protective, and the body of changes which 
it made were unimpressive being on the whole neither im-
portant nor numerous. In the nature of the Tariff Commis-
sion lies the explanation not only of the nature of these 
changes but also of the meagre amount of good whioh it did 
under section 315. It is a bi-partisan body containing 
usually equal numbers of the two major political parties. 
In spite of the care in the selection of these members 
there arise the inevitable disagreements between members. 
The reports on really important changes are usually divided 
into Majority Report and Minority dissenting report. With 
all of the dissention there is likely to be more sentiment 
in favor of one sort of change, either downward or upward 
than for the other. While there was no power to change 
rates given to the commission under President Wilson still 
it refleoted in a measure his own attitudes and the attitudt 
of the Democratic Party. This effect is largely accounted 
for in the select personnel of the body and by the graduallr 
disappearing line of demarcation between the two major pol-
itical parties on the tariff issue. That is to say there 
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are men who hold very liberal views upon the trade policy 
who are Republioans in spite of that, and Demoorats who 
remain Demoorats in spite of high protectionist views. 
From the groups of protectionists among the Democrats may 
be chosen the Democratic members of the commission during 
a Republican administration while the Democratic president 
may appoint Republicans who sympathize with the free trade 
principle. This posSibility becomes an apparent reality 
when we inspect the personnel of the tariff commission and 
examine the changes in that personnel. 
The chairman of the first commission was the re-
cognized prime authority on tariffs in this country, none 
other than he from whom much in this paper is derived, 
Dr. Frank W. Taussig of Harvard University. The next 
chairman was Thomas Walker Page, who had been a member of 
a Tariff Board under President Taft. His views upon the 
tariff favored moderate protection while Mr. Taussig favorEd 
moderate protection carried out toward free trade as a goal 
to be worked toward. Edward P. Costigan, now Senator from 
Colorado was also a moderate protectionist. Ntt. Costigan 
at that time was affiliated with the Progressive Party while 
the others were Democrats. 
William S. Culbertson and William Kent were re-
presentatives of the Republican party but neither was a 
very pronounced protectionist. David J. Lewis, another 
Democrat, believing in simplifying and revising the tariff. 
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Daniel C. Roper served for about three months and his 
place was taken by Mr. Page. 
The third annual report of the commission in 
1919 announced the reSignation of Professor Taussig whose 
term it had been recognized from the beginning was only 
temporary since other affairs called pressingly for his 
time. Mr. Kent resigned in 1920 hence the 1920 report is 
signed by only four commissioners. 
President Harding appointed to the committee 
Thomas O. Marvin, a high protectionist, and William Bur-
gess, a lobbyist for the pottery interests. Mr. Marvin 
became chairman in January, 1920, and continued in that 
position until 1922. Mr. Page's reSignation in 1923 left 
open a Democratic position which was filled by Mr. Glassi., 
a protectionist Democrat from Louisiana. It is to be noted 
that the appointments of Republican preSidents follow.d 
closely Republican principles just as Democratic appointees 
had not failed to be in favor of Democratic principles. 
There were further appointments but these suffice 
to explain the trends in rate changes during this period. 
Mr. Costigan had decided in Maroh, 1928, that the commis-
sion was suffioiently well organized upon protectionist 
lines to prevent his having any influence upon its findings. 
So he resigned on March 14, as a final protest against the 
actions of the body of which he had since its first organ-
ization been a member. 
P.AR~ EIGHT 
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The Tariff Act of 1930. 
From time to time in this country there comes a 
spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction with the tariff sit-
uation. Behind such an unrest lie many reasons and causes 
savoring of various degrees of political and economic ex-
pediency. One causal factor in bringing about a new re-
vision of the tariff in 1928-30 was the outcome of the 
election in which the people chose the Republican party 
for the administering of the affairs of government for the 
period 1928 to 1932. 
Aside from the tradition involved there is no 
particular reason to fael that the selection of the ae-
publicans at this time had any particular connection with 
the tariff issue. A8 a matter of fact the two major parti s 
were for once without a discernable disagreement upon the 
principle of tariffs. The Democratic Platform1 in 1928 
contains two interesting clauses, "the Democratic tariff 
legislation will be based on the following policies: a. 
the maintenance of legitimate business and a high standard 
of wages for American Labor, and d. Duties that will permi 
effective competition, insure against monopoly and at the 
same time produce a fair revenue for the support of govern 
mente Actual difference between cost of production at hom 
1 
Democratic Campaign Book, 1928. Democratic National 
committee, etc. 33S:--I92a:--
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and abroad, with adequate safeguard for the wage of the 
American laborer, must be the extreme measure of every 
tariff rate." 
Without referring to the Republican statement 
which is far less concise it may be noted that the stand 
of the Democratic party i8 essentially in agreement with 
the principle of protection and the principle of compsxati e 
costs as it was first annunciated by the Republican party 
in the campaign of 1908. It cannot be said with any degre 
of truth that there waS a real issue between the parties 
upon the principle of tariffs in 1928. 
Even in the dis CUBS ion regarding the Fordney Act 
there was a degree of agreement. The Republican party 
heIdI that the act of 1922 had done Signal service to the 
commerce and industry of the country, even permitting 
themselves the obvious absurdity of claiming that it was 
responsible for the increased imports ruld exports duxing 
the years in which it was effective. However, they con-
tinued to point out that the changing competitive condi-
tions had somewhat outmoded that legislation and that ther 
existed a need for a general overhauling and institution 
of changes of considerable scope. There was extant a stat -
2 ment of W. S. Myers which found considerable place in the 
IPlatform 1928. 356-357. Democratic CampaiSA~. 1928. 
2The Republican Party, A History. 465-7. }~era, w. s. 
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Democratic speeches of that year. Of the tariff act of 
1922 it said, nIt is the most ill-drawn legislative act 
of recent political history ••••••• T.he country has prospered 
in large part due to post war conditions abroad and in 
spite of rather than because of the Fordney-McCumber tarifj~ 
The Democrats had never felt that there was any 
particular need for further revision when the Emergency 
act was passed in 1921. Then the enormous increase of 
rates in the Fordney bill was ocoasioned for nation-wide 
comment and condemnation. Throughout the period there was 
criticism of the act but the nature of such criticism had 
undergone a subtile change. In spite of the continuanoe 
of the always-prevalent talk about the enormous unearned 
profits of monster industries sheathed in protection there 
came a new and more insistent note. The international 
aspects of the American tariff and its real relation to 
the intricate debt situation which grew out of the war 
began to overshadow the domestic aspects of such legis-
lation. While more will be written elsewhere in this re-
gard it is important to note that there arose quite an in-
sistent body of opinion about the relation of tariffs to 
debts which furnished material for the opponents of the 
1930 law. 
Industry was divided into two camps on tariff 
revision. The newspapers quoted such industrialists a8 
Ford, Erskine, and General Motors as opposed to the revision, 
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The Business Weekl poll of corporation executive 
returned two to one against general tariff revision. Other 
industries such as the sugar industry and the rayon induet 
as well as a great bloc of agricultural interests were in 
favor of revision because it would profit them, they be-
lieved. 
Both parties in their 1928 platforms contained 
statements which can be construed to have the import that 
taxiff legislation may be of benefit to the farmer. 
Throughout the study of the causes of a change 
in tariffs, at least, any change which partakes the nature 
of a general revision there is one point which is so obvio s 
that it cannot escape notice. Regardless of the standpoin 
of leaders in business, and of economists the party electe 
whether Democrat or Republican in 1928 was bound by pre-
cedent and promise to do something with the tariff. In 
general their promises were to spread it out more evenly, 
and the differences in method, the one wanting to lower 
the high spots and the other desiring to raise the low 
spots are only differences in method, which without con-
structive leadership and powerful control would resolve 
into theoretical differences valid in principle but null 
in practice. 
lBusiness Week. April 2, 1930. 
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As before, a powerful lobby backed some of the 
provisions of the law "Representatives of industrial group 
in quest of higher duties crowded the lobbies of Congress~ 
The information upon which duties were levied was still 
obtained largely from interested business interprises who 
could profit by deft misrepresentation of costs. The 
Tariff Commission had found in some cases strong oppositio 
to the presence of their experts examining costs in the 
books of foreign industries. After being so obtained the 
duties were frequently amended (in the Senate 1253 times) 
or the administration charged so as to materially alter 
the intent of the bill as we note in the higher tariffs 
imposed under a resolution to reduce them. After both 
House and Senate have had their turns at changing the 
proposed legislation the conference committee compromises 
between the two with rates which far from following any 
principle are designed to paclficate the members of the 
two bodies. 
The present law was passed in June, 1930 after 
a long career of discussion in the Rouse and Senate. 
Senator Harrison opened the final debate in the Senate on 
June 9. 2 Hia main points were that the proposed measure 
1Beara, Charles At, and William Beard. !E! American 
Leviathan. 1930. 457. 
2 
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would increase the cost of living $1,000,000,000; 2, that 
it was opposed to the trade principle whereby foreign debts 
could be paid; 3, it was an affront to foreign nations in 
proof of whioh he cited 38 protests received by the state 
department; 4, it stimulates inefficiency in industries 
without eoonomic advantage; 5, it drives American industry 
abroad where production costs axe not raised by tariffs. 
He was followed by Senator Thomas of Oklahoma who made his 
chief argument upon the possibility of retaliation by 42 
protesting nations including Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominion Republic, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greese, Guatamala. 
Hungary, Honduras, Irish Free state, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Mexico, Newfoundland, Netherland, Norway, Parguay, Fersia, 
Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Uraguay, etc. 
As reprisals, measures in Canada in conjunction 
with the British preferential tariff for empire trade was 
cited. As replies the same arguments that have bolstered 
the protectionist from the beginning were used. The chief 
argument in this class is the high wages in industry plea 
for the American workman who must it is claimed be working 
on the same wage scale as foreigh labor if his products 
are sold in the same competitive market. The converse of 
this theory is somewhat more tenable as presented in the 
Senate. The effort of the foreign producer to produce at 
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a cost less than the American producer by as much as the 
amount of the tariff forces his labor to work at lower 
wages than he otherwise would. How well based such an 
assertion may be is difficult to determine, but it has the 
smack of truth to it. 
After the final debates in which there was marke 
confusion on both sides and in whioh the defense seemed 
content to rest the vote in the Senate passed the proposed 
act 44 to 42 as it had returned from conference committee. 
As it waS resubmitted to the House in March the vote had 
been 53 to 31 so it may be seen that the bill lost favor 
in the changes of the committee. The act as a whole as 
finally passed contained 1814 paragraphs. The Senate 
amended it 1253 times so it may be seen that it was not 
solely the work of the House. Final passage by the Rep-
resentatives on June 14 was accomplished by 222 to 153 
majority. 
The party division on the bill was fairly clear. 
On the final vote in the Senate 44 for 42 against there 
were 39 Republicans and 5 Democrats in the majority and 
31 Democrats and 11 Republicans in the minority.l In the 
House-the vote was also on well defined party lines. Pe-
culiarly enough Senator McMaster, who introduced the re-
solution in 1928 "favoring reduction of Tariff Schedules 
and the consideration of tariff legislation at the present 
IHawley Smoot Tar~ff Bill of 1930. Senate Document 111. 
7lst Congress, 2nd Session. 344-5. 
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session" voted nay on the final passage of the bill. Since 
the act as passed cannot be readily compared with other 
laws since its effectiveness has never been tested under 
normal circumstances, I shall attempt only a superficial 
examination of the items. The law did not involve a com-
plete revision of the duties nor any really important 
changes in the administrative clauses. Duties upon agri-
cultural l?roductsl were increased as shown in the fo11owin 
1922 1930 - -
Cattle per lb. lt to 2" 2i to 3" 
Beef and Veal 3¢ 6" 
Swine i1 2tj 
Pork ito 2¢ 2t to 3i-¢' 
Eggs per doz. a¢ lOst 
Corn 15, per bu. 25" per bu. 
of 48 lbs. of 56 1bs. 
Rye per bu. 15¢ 15¢' 
Wheat per bu. 30s{ 42¢ 
Cotton of staple 
1 1/8 a. free 7rj, per lb. 
The conditions since the passage of this aot 
have been adverse to a real test of these duties. The 
prices of agricultural products have declined so as to 
make most of these duties prohibitive but American agri-
1 Tariff Act of 1930. Senate Document 166. 71st SOag%ea" 
2nd Session. and Comparison Tariff Ac~l909, 1913, and 1 22. 
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culture does not seem to have benefitted by the reservat10E 
of the domestic market for its goods. It is very unlikely 
that the tariff can ever be devised to help the farmer in 
any direct manner since the farmer is largely a producer 
for exports. A tariff on agricultural products is not 
open to any particularly damning criticism. It does not 
in most cases add to the cost of living since the farmer 
does produce most things economically. The chief criticisu 
which can be offered is that such a tariff is ineffective. 
As protection it is unnecessary. The sad thing about agri-
culture and the tariff is the trading between agriculture 
and industry which usually recoils against agriculture. In 
spite of the fact that the domestic sugar industry fails tc 
provide even one-fourth of the sugar consumed, protection 
of it has been increased in this act. Cuban sugar formerl~ 
1.76l6¢ becomes 2.00, and all other sugars increase from 
2.20¢ to 2.50¢ per pound. It will be recalled that the 
Tariff Commission in 1925 recommended a lowering of the 
sugar duties. The domestic price of sugar has been under 
$3.00 per hundred pounds. Duties on wool were increased. 
From the free list cement is now dutied at 6¢ per ~dred 
pounds, bricks at $1.26 per M, hides at 10% and shoes in 
compensation at 20%. 
One of the di_cuesion points was the sugar duty. 
Many changes have come about which cause one to weigh and 
measure the advantages of the tariff on sugar. The Cuban 
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Ambassador to the United states »o1nts outl that "for three 
years American sugar properties in Cuba have lost on an 
average $50,000,000 annually." The capital invested has 
depreciated in value until he estimates that over one half 
of the $600,000,000 invested has been lost. Further 106S8$ 
are entailed in decreased buying power which has cut import~ 
from the United states into Cuba. The significant thing 
about the whole statement is the comparison of the worth 
of the American investment in Cuba with its vast productive 
capacity to the worth of the small protected American in-
dustry. The question as he puts it is which one of theae 
two interests should be sacrificed to the other. 
The law provides for the reorganization of the 
Tariff Commission. Its powers were left materially as they 
were made in 1922. Changes in Personnel under reorganiza-
tion left Commissioners Brossard, Dennis, and Dixon of the 
outgoing commission and added Thomas Walker Page, a former 
commissioner, J. L. Coulter and Henry P. Fletcher. As far 
as this investigation can determine the duties of the com-
mission were not altered. The chief factor in reorganiza-
tion seems to be a change in the length of terms to be 
served. The former commission was for 12 years; these are 
for 6 years except the initial appointments are for 1, 2, 
3,4, 5, and 6 years and one new commission is granted to 
lAnnalS of the American Academy. 144:63. 
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fill the vacancy of the expiring commission each year. 
The duties of the commission are to investigate 
upon the order of the Senate, the President or upon its 
own initiative the costs of production at home and abroad 
for purposes of comparison in forming tariff rates. It 
also recommends changes in rates which may be Presidential 
proclamation be put into effect immediately. 
1 The report of the Tariff Commission 1931 shows 
the following action: 
.b1dible gelatin • • • • • • • 5¢ plus 40% to 6¢ plus 12% 
Ul tremarine blue •••••• No change 
Feldspar crude •••••••• ~l.OO per ton to $.50 per to 
Cement •••••••••••••.•• 6¢ per 100 lbs to 6¢ per 100 
Guage glass •••• • • • • • • • • 60% 600fo 
Window glass •••••••••• Reduction 25% 
Iron in pig8 and 
Iron Kentlidge 
• • • • • • 
Woven Wire fencing ••••• 
Netting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cylinder wires ••••••••• 
Could reach no conclusions 
due to variety of sources, 
transportation, etc. No 





Pins. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• England chief competi tor. 
Exchange so disturbed that 
no recommendations were made 
Bells • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• Most types unable to gain 
conclusive data. 
Bicycles. • • •• • • • • • • • • • • 40% to 70% 
IFifteenth.Annual Report of the U.S. Tariff Commission. 
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(table--continued) 
Lumber of fir, spruo., ••• No change in duty recommendec 
pine, hemlock, and larch 
Bent wood furniture ••••• 
Wood flour • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maple Sugar • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maple syrup • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cheese (except American 
or Chedder and Swiss or. 
Emmenthaler) 
47i% to 42Mb 
33 1/2% to 25% 
S¢ per Ib to 6¢ 
5i¢' per lb to 4¢ 
7¢ per lb. not less than 35~ 
Commission made no findings 
due to lack of likeness in 
types, lack of importation, 
lack of domestic m£g. and 
other difficulties. 
Dried egg products ••••• lS¢ lb. to 27¢ lb. 
Cherries eulfered or in b 
brine •••••••••••••••••• findings not approved by 
President. 
Tomatoes, Prepared--
Preserved •••••••••••••• New investigation ordered. 
Tomatoes, fresh •••••••• No change specified 
Cucumbers, fresh ••••••• did not specify change 
Okre, fresh •••••••••••• " " n " 
Beans, green " n tt " • • • • • • • • • • • 
Peas, green • • • • • • • • • • • s¢ to 3.9¢ per lb. 
Lima beans ••••••••••••• did not specify change 
Eggplant ••••••••••••••• 3¢ to It¢ per lb. 
Peppers •••••••••••••••• 3¢ to 2i¢ per lb. 
Pineapples ••••••••••••• No change 
Hemp cordage • • • • • • • • • • 3t¢ to 4 7/S¢ per lb. 
Wool felt hats ••••••••• 40¢' plUB 755& to 40tj, plus 56%t 
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(table--continued) 
Wool floor covering 
N.S.P.F •••••••••••••••• 
Hats, bonnets and hoods 
of straw •••••••••••••• 
Boots and Shoes ••••••• 
No change 
$4~lus 60% doz to $3 plus 
5070 per doz 
20% !{o change. 
:Pipe organs and parts.. 40% to 35% 
:Pipes and smoker's 
articles •••••••••••••• No findings. 
Rides and skins of 
cattle •••••••••••••••• No change warranted. 
Pigskin leather ••••••• 25% to 15% 
While a complete investigation of the changes ha 
not been made as regards the amount of trade affected by 
these changes the consequences could not be very great. 
In 20 of the 43 investigations no changes were made, in 
five other cases changes were very small. Considerable 
changes were made in crude feldspar (downward), window 
glass (downward), bicycle bells (upward), maple sugar and 
syrup (downward), and straw hats (downward). Feldspar is 
produced according to the commission for $2.44 per ton les 
in this country than elsewhere (Canida); therefore the dut 
was decreased as much as possible. Window glass imports 
are rapidly decreasing the duty as decreased still amply 
covers the 1.7¢ per pound difference in production costs. 
Less than i of the domestic consumption of maple sugar is 
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produced in this country. The industry as a whole gains 
about $1.800.000 from the tariff but the cost to consumers 
is at least three times as great. There is no well devel-
oped dried egg industry in this country. The tariff was 
raised in the hope of stimulating the growth of new plants. 
The work of the Commission as delineated by the 
report is substantially praiseworthy and one is impressed 
with the high quality of the services performed by that 
body. Under the terms of their duties their services are 
noteworthy. In the cases of bells, iron pens and cheese 
there was failure to obtain reliable data. In these cases 
the technilogical difficulties combined with such intricate 
problems as the variety of sources and conditions of pro-
duction both here and abroad have made it impossible for 
any body of observers no matter how sage their judgments 
or how astute their observations to rightly determine a 
tariff rate on the so-called scientific principle of com-
parative costs. 
The quality of the service rendered is as great 
as its quantity is insignificant. The investigation of a 
few items whose production in this country is very limited 
cannot be regarded as less than failure of the Commission 
viewed from the aspirations of its founders. The general 
idea lurking behind 8uch a commission is the altering of 
~ otherwise ill-drawn law to fit conditions. Confidence 
that the Commission could really give a tariff bill a 
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general overhauling is often expressed. Such economists 
as F. W. Taussig feel that the tariff should eventually 
find its duties raised and lowered by such a commission. 
To such optimistic ideas the obvious answer is that the 
rate of investigation so far has proved far too slow for 
any appreciable revision to occur in reasonable time even 
when conditions are fairly stable and surely no one will 
assent that the tariff can be revised by any agency with 
sufficient celerity to meet with unusual economic conditioIS. 
Valuable as the work of the commission is it still is of 
insignificant proportions when the whole tariff law is 
taken into account. 
Important as the domestic effects of the tariff 
are they can easily be summarized in few words. A great 
many duties are ineffective. This country produces goods 
for export, many articles of which are protected at home, 
yet compete successfully in world markets. Again in such 
unorganized trades as agriculture the domestic competition 
lowers the price to world levels depressed by the export 
surplus and in such cases the tariff is largely ineffective. 
Again there are the cases in which hard domestic competi-
tion causes prices to be as low here as abroad in spite of 
the tariff. And there are industries which cannot compete 
in the export market, who do not produce to supply the do-
mestic demand. The profits in such industries are frequentiy 
assured by protection. Under such conditions the general 
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body of consumers are paying in increased prices the cost 
of protection. Anyone who tries to argue that protection 
does not raise the cost of living denies the essential thi~g 
about it. If it does not bring higher prices it is inef-
fective and may well be abandoned. Likewise the proponente 
of protection are prone to pOint to increased imports 
proudly exhibited as the fruit of protection. If protec-
tion did not inhibit imports it could not preserve the do-
mestic market for home industry. There are many factors 
easily forgotten in such a controversy and among them is 
the desire of a prosperous people for imported goods of 
certain types. The Paris dress, the Venetian vase, the 
Italian painting are examples of this trend. The growth 
of imports is important in a sense but it cannot easily be 
correlated with the tariff. The matter of much greater 
importance is the change in direction of imports. 
While it is doubtful that the American Tariff 
excited so much retaliation as it has been credited with 
nevertheless there has been some retaliation. Senator 
Harrisson has pOinted out that the British Empire tariffs 
were aimed at the United states. Other tariffs in Europe 
have arisen partially in ·response to the American Tariff 
and partially out of the effort to clothe the industrial 
exposure caused by the changes in boundaries after the war. 
These changes were made along political rather than indus-
trial lines. 
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A new problem has arisen in connection with the 
tariff. Normally as a nation involved but little in in-
ternational trade during its early history the tariff pol-
icy of the United states was not a matter of great concern 
in the outer world. As a growing commercial and trading 
nation the policy of high protective tariffs helped to ste~ 
the tide of imports while not seriously hampering exports 
during the years that the United states was a debtor countr~. 
The so-called favorable balance of trade which the tariff 
stimulated helped to pay the foreign debts ruld was a factor 
in keeping the condition of business in this country normal~ 
As conditions changed the nature of exports and imports 
also changed. The war in which this country served as a 
banker changed the status of this country from a debtor 
nation in an ordinary sense to a creditor nation in a large 
sense than the world had ever before understood. In the 
calculation of the world's trade balqnce it was found that 
this country had $25,000,000,000 due her from other nations 
This figure attains new significance when it is noted that 
~he world's supply of monet~ry gold amounts to less than 
~alf that sum. The annual trade of the United states had 
grown to almost $10,000.000,000 with still more exports 
~han imports. The flow of gold in that case was toward 
uhe United states. The amount that exports exceed imports 
nust be in gold or the extension of additional credit. Intc 
~his debt situation the United states introduced the habitual 
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increase in tariffs which tended to throw the whole system 
still further out of balance. Let i~ be remembered that 
it was from Europe that we were expecting debt settlements 
and that neither Europe nor the world had gold enough to 
pay the debts. If pay should come it would come in the 
surplus of goods from Europe over our goods to Europe. 
But the course of American development had been toward 
more and larger industries. As the case had been for tar-
iff to build a more self-sufficient America so it had been 
accomplished and more and more America came to produce the 
same goods as ~~ope. ~e nature of trade changed. As in 
the beginning America had been a source of raw materials 
and a selling place for produced goods so gradually manu-
facturers began to take the place of raw materials in ex-
ports and the domestic producers consumed more of the raw 
materials. The growth of industries began to cut down the 
demand for European goods and the two continents began to 
compete with one another for the world's trade. The mass 
production and standardization of America, utilizing to 
the greatest degree the efficiency of specialization began 
to capture the markets of the world. These general trends 
were all interpreted as highly desirable. The Federal 
Government has a tremendous force of commercial agents 
~orking to expand forei~l trade everywhere. 
If we sell more to Europe than she sells to us 
she may still find attractive markets for her goods and 
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restore or change the trade balance. If we sell m0re to 
Europe than she does to us, and we persist in forcing 
American products into the markets in the farthest corners 
of the world then Europe has little opportunity for ever 
maintaining the sort of trade balance by which the debt 
may be paid. The efforts of ~~ope to face obligations 
arising out of the war has depleted the gold reserve. and 
left Europe with little capital to face the still importan 
business of rebuilding the intricate commercial relation-
ships, encouraging the growth of industry, and forcing her 
goods anew into the channels of trade. The larger part of 
the world's supply of monetary gold has thus found its way 
into the coffers of the United states. 
The world is at present suffering a severe and 
pro~onged depression. Imports and exports have decreased 
greatly, production has been curtailed, and unemployment 
is everywhere. In the opinion of many business men this 
condition is due at least partially to the tariff debt 
policy of the United states. Paul Mazurl , one of the keen 
est minds devoted to international political SCience, pre-
dicts just such an outcome as the world is witnessing. 
Two effects are obvious. The market for American exports 
has been greatly diminished, and the high tariffs here and 
abroad have conspired to cause American capital to be 
1 
congress, Record. Vol 72, Part 10, 10379.10381. June 10. 
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invested abroad in subsidiaries or branches of established 
American industries. Anyone who believes that this move-
ment is narrow in scope and small in volume is invited to 
peruse the partial list of American industries abroad which 
covers six columns of the Congressional Racordl which lists 
several hundred branches in more than twenty countries. 
The effects of the loss of exports plus the growt~ 
of industry financed by American capital abroad places the 
country in an unusual dilemma. If tariffs axe lowered the 
exports and imports may increase but the advantages of the 
branch factories will be largely nullified whereas if tar-
iffs are kept at the present level the debt situation may 
continu~ to be acute until the capital invested abroad 
~ill decrease in value thus causing great loss to investors 
~f the two courses the first is preferable since the res-
toration of world stability will in all likelihood be of 
benefit even to American industries abroad. 
The tariff is the paramount factor in the present 
debt situation. Cancellation as a remedy could only be 
~emporary if the balance of trade continued to be favorable 
~o this country. It is seldom remembered in discussion of 
aancellation that such a move is tantamount to giving Europe 
goods when we ship more to Europe than she ships back. It 
~s also very important that the cost of cancellation be not 
~Congressional Reoord. Vol. 72. part 10. 10379.10380-
10381. June 10, 1930. 
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another additional burden upon the back of that little re-
garded person known as the consumer. 
Surpluses in production, the result of the great 
ingenuity and application of American industry, bring con-
current conclusions in the tariff issue. The conclusion 
is bourne with great force upon the world today that America 
can no longer sell her produce in the domestic market. ThE 
vast skill in management, the advantages of establishment, 
the skill of salesmanship, the excellence of highly devel-
oped and efficient transportation all these things added 
to the low unit cost of mass production and its infinite 
unilization of the advantages of minute specialization 
have brought about an industrial organization whose pro-
ducts cannot be utilized in raising the standard of living 
in America alone. Export surpluses are a reality greater 
than we realize. The continued growth of the great econom-
ical industries of America depend upon the ability to sell 
abroad and this ability in tUXIl depends upon the buying 
power of other countries. This buying power depends in 
part upon sales of their goods to us and the motivating 
power in the continuance of world prosperity seems to be 
the abandonment of trade restrictions. 
PART NINE 
TARIFF OUTLOOK FOR 
1932 
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There is likely to be some revision of the Act 
of 1930 when the first session of the new Congress meets 
after the election of a President. The factors which this 
paper has pointed out in the present situation are not 
likely to overcome the sectional and industrial d~~an~_f~_~ __ _ 
high tariffs. The present trend if continued will place a 
Democratic majority in both houses of Congress. This does 
not, however, insure that there will be any tariff reform. 
The tariff policy of the Democrats is hard to ascertain. 
Mr. Roosevelt has spoken of the tariff in such a way as to 
imply a knowledge of the debt-tariff problem. Various in-
consequential measures have been brought up in the House. 
The Associatad Press recently carried the news that a 
measura to suspend protection for a commodity when there is 
not full competition among its domestic producers, spon-
sored by Senator Norris of Nebraska, has passed the Senate. 
The changes in public opinion are accomplished very slowly. 
The full import of the present involution will never be 
universally comprehended nor measures to fit the situation 
generally demanded. The hope of America lies not in the 
amelioration of the tariff difficulty but rather in the 
great recuperative power to prosper despite a poorly in-
tegrated and generally short Sighted tariff policy. 
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Conclusions. 
The tariff legislation in the United states has 
become more and more comple.x. The first taxiff covered 
but a page or two of the treasury reports. Now they are 
published in a separate volume the 1930 act covering 192 
pages exclusive of its indexes. The more than 1800 para-
graphs cover thirteen schedules in which there are contained 
the many articles listed in 66 pages of the double column 
index. Perhaps the complexity of the problem may be in-
dicated by the fact that the board of experts and the 
Tariff Commission were able to investigate only 43 articles 
in the first year after the act of 1980 and that on many 
of these articles it was impossible to get reliable in-
formation. or the technilogical details were too intricate 
to be accurately investigated. One cannot help reaching 
the conclusion that the general revisions of Congress must 
be but hasty ill-advised bits of legislation drawn about 
matters of which there are frequently problems which con-
found the experts. 
Early tariffs arose from national need of reve-
nues and a general hope that manu£actures might rise out 
of such legislation. The growth of industrial influence 
over legislation has been a feature of the recent tariff 
laws. Another peculiar circumstance may be noted in this 
connection and that is the fact that the tariff is regarde~ 
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as the American sacred cow. Never has any issue siesed so 
strongly upon the imaginations of those ignorant of the 
elementary principles of its working. 
The arguments by which the tariff was originally 
justified are those contained in Hamilton's "Report on 
Manufacturers." The chief interest of the tariff makers 
was in preserving national integrity and a degree of in-
dependence at the same time raising revenue and aiding in-
fant industries. With the war of 1812 and every succeedi~ 
war including the World War there arose the vested interes1s 
argument under which industries existing as the outgrowth 
of war claimed insurance of continued profits by the gov-
ernment in the form of protective tariffs. In this way 
many new industries were added to the protective system. 
Now the chief claim to protection comes from any industry 
which is not making profits at present without a tariff or 
under the present tariff. 
The growth of industry under the tariff has been 
cited time after time as justification for higher and higher 
tariffs. It is true that protection has frequently aided 
an infant industry and that such industries are important 
in the present makeup of American business but contingent 
upon this has been protection continued long after the 
need for it has passed. Further, the growth of industry 
must be attributed to the presence of vast natural resource_. 
the budding and fruition of great inventive genius. In the 
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great majority of cases it is impossible to trace any 
direct connection between prosperous industry and the 
tariff. 
The imports and foreign trade have grown greatly 
during the life of the nation. As far as can be determinec 
there is no reason to attribute any of this trade to the 
tariff. There was little effect upon trade in the early 
tariffs as compared to the present because the early ex-
ports consisted largely of raw products. 
In about 1870 the Republican Party began to 
sponsor protectionl There was a real division of the 
parties upon this issue until the present time. We now 
find little solidarity of opinion among Democrats. 
The present situation involves a domestic problen 
and a problem in international relations. The tariff 
passed largely because of domestic demand conflicts with 
the interests of the country in trade with hllrope and pay-
ment of the vast war debts. Indications are that the tar-
iff must be altered to permit freer trade or the debts must 
be canoelled. 
At present the tariff outlook is cloudy. Depres-
sion brought about in a measure by the act of 1930 hovers 
over Europe and America. There is a dearth of good tariff 
leadership and a great common misapprehension of the pro-
blems which the world faces. If Europe and America are to 
resume the march of progress some measures must be taken 
to break tariff bonds. 
157 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
"A Study of American Tariff Legislation." 
The idea or philosophy behind tariffs is the mer-
cantile doctrine which values highly the precious metals 
received in payment of export surpluses. This together 
wi th the outgrowths of it which in the beginning were only 
incidental to it; that is, the purpose of protection of 
industries and the gaining of revenues, explain the first 
united states tariffs. But these tariffs were only out-
growths of those colonial tariffs used by the colonies and 
by the mother countries to change the direction of the fl01 
of trade, a thoroughly mercantilistic concept. 
There are three general considerations in any 
study of phenomena and these I have applied to my study 
of the tariff. What caused it? What kind of thing is it, 
or what are its characteristics? What are its effects or 
what has, it done? So with the first American tariff this 
has been done rather carefully. A general summary of the 
development of the country has served to make clear some 
matters which deeply affect the workings of import duties. 
So it is discovered that the first duties were largely for 
the purpose of gaining revenues for P.ying the debts and 
defraying the costs of government. The hold of manufact-
urers is precarious and the produce of the neW country is 
mainly agricultural its people are chiefly landholders, 
and its manufacturing aarried on in the home. 
More clearly after 1816 the legislation took on 
the nature of protection. Vested industries arose out of 
the war; the peace in Europe put her agricultural popula-
tion back to work as well as the indu8trial machinery and 
the United states faced an influx of manu£actures with a 
loss of markets for agriculture. Being in no position to 
trade the country put up a tariff to stop trade. The gen-
eral level was about 25% on enumerated articles. The chief 
articles protected were steel and textiles. Until 1833 the 
tariff gradually rose but the country became less afraid 
of competition from abroad and the tariff of 1828 taxed raw 
materials so indiscriminately that the revision of 1833 
marked the beginning of gradual reduction until in 1842 the 
duties were reduced horizontally to 20% ad valorum. In 
1843 Treasurer Walker produced his report which is import-
ant for three reasons. It originates the schedule system 
of writing tariffs which still remain essentially unchangeci 
it simplified the administrative details of the tariff; and 
it set forth the soundest economic principles upon which a 
tariff can be administered. The general principle of oom-
parative costs is implied here for the first time. 
The gradually raising tariffs after 1842 con-
tinued until 1846 when the Walker report exerted such a 
profound influence over legislation. In the following 
years until 1860 there existed a low tariff period which 
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industries. A horizontal reduction of 10% occurred in 
1872 but was revoked in 1875. One signific~' change in 
1872 was the taking duties off tea and coffee. These re-
liable souroes of revenue were abandoned in time of surplus 
revenues rather than dropping duties on some protected 
articles. The tariff from then on was undeniably protec-
tive. 
The problem of the tariff was becoming more com-
plicated all the time. In 1883 the revision was unsatis-
factory to several groups. There was no determined opinion 
in favor of such a bill and it passed the Senate by a ma-
jority of only one vote. This revision was upward. In 
1890 further upward revision occurred but the issue of the 
next election was the tariff and Presi·dent Cleveland was 
~lected to lower the duties. As fate would have it the 
predit situation was on the verge of breaking down due to 
~he great volume of Silver purchases under the Sherman Act. 
~he panic thus initiated was laid at the door of the low 
~ariff of 1894 and the next election returned the Republioms 
~o power on the free silver issue. Interpreted as a victorJ 
for high protection this election was followed by the act 
)f 1897 raising protection even higher. No action was takeI 
~n the next few years since the industry and trade were 
~rospering; however, agitation began again in 1908 and fol-
lowed a general revision of little consequence in 1909. The 
election of a Democratic Congress in 1910 and a president 
lS9 
~8S marked by the same growth of manufactures and increase 
in general prosperity which had been noted during periods 
of greater protection. There has been little connection 
between protection and prosperity in general. Some indus-
tries were helped by protectlonbut they were not materiall, 
hindered by freer trade. 
The Civil War is deeply rooted in the protective 
system. The North profited by tariffs, and the South lost 
by them. Industry and agriculture, the eternal opponents 
on this question were segregated in a sense. The agricu1~ 
tural south protested the tariff of 1828 but mutual con-
cesaions plus the determination of Jackson posponed the 
settlement until the Act of 1857 brought it to light again. 
The Civil War settled the policy of protection upon this 
country. First, it was primarily a war to determine that 
policy, further, it created new vested industries, and, it 
brought about revenue duties that were protective which 
could not be removed later. This series of causes drove 
the nail of protectionism into the American Economic Struc-
ture and clenched it. 
After the war the duties raised in the course of 
the war for purposes of defraying its expe~ses were not 
lowered. In fact there was little revision until 1872 
and the revision that did occur was of the nature of speci!l 
legislation at the behest of interested parties. Legisla-
tion of this type occurred in the wool, iron t and marble 
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in 1912 brought a sharp downward revision--the Underwood 
act. Not tested under normal conditions this act proved 
successful as a war tariff. The Tariff Commission to in-
vestigate rates war formed in March 1917 with F. W. Taussi@ 
at its head. 
The Emergency act in 1921 and the Fordney-McCumber 
tariff in 1922 raised rates by more than 10% on dutiable 
goods. The Tariff Commission was given new powers to re-
commend rates and the President was delegated the power to 
change rates upward or downward not more than 50% by pro-
clamation. This power was not used extensively, but in 
most of the cases in which it was used the change was up-
ward. 
In 1930 the Hawley-Smoot Tariff was created 
arising out of changed conditions partly but chiefly out oj 
political expediency. It did not materially change the 
rates of 1922; the greater changes being in the Agricu1turE~ 
Schedule and related matters. Unpopular with business men 
and economists this law barely managed to muster a majoritJ 
in the Senate. Its changes amount to about 2% upward re-
vision average. This figure represents an even smaller 
real change. In 1922 and 1923 the international signifi-
cance of the issue became clear. More important than do-
mestic consequences was the psychological effect of higher 
duties upon debtors who must pay in goods subject to tar-
iffs. Two solutions are possible: cancellation of debts 
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or 2, revision of teriff with debts in mind. 
Conclusions. 
1. Tariffs have grown increasingly complex and 
difficult of administration. 
2. Early tariffs rose primarily from need for 
revenue; they now arise in a process the factors in which 
are the political expedienoy, the demands of interests as 
expressed through lobbies, and a small factor of expert 
opinion of the Tariff Commission. More and more the tariff 
is being regarded as a fetish by the uninformed majority. 
3. It is true that tariff has stimulated industry 
in many cases but protection costs the consumer, and it is 
hard to withdraw it once granted. The real effect is not 
easily measured because it is only one, and not the major, 
factor in bringing about industrial America. 
4. The period 1870-1921 is marked by party dis-
agreement upon this issue. The Republicans were for high 
protection, the Democrats for downward revision. This dif-
ference has now largely disappeared. 
5. The change of U. S. From a debtor to a credito.' 
nation creates a new tariff situation. Lower duties or can 
cellation are necessary. 
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